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 DATA SEGMENTATION IN ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE: 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The issue of whether and, if so, to what extent patients should have control over the sharing or 
withholding of their health information represents one of the foremost policy challenges related 
to electronic health information exchange.  It is widely acknowledged that patients’ health 
information should flow where and when it is needed to support the provision of appropriate and 
high-quality care.  Equally significant, however, is the notion that patients want their needs and 
preferences to be considered in the determination of what information is shared with other 
parties, for what purposes, and under what conditions.  Some patients may prefer to withhold or 
sequester certain elements of health information, often when it is deemed by them (or on their 
behalf) to be "sensitive," whereas others may feel strongly that all of their health information 
should be shared under any circumstance.   
 
This discussion raises the issue of data segmentation, which we define for the purposes of this 
paper as the process of sequestering from capture, access or view certain data elements that are 
perceived by a legal entity, institution, organization, or individual as being undesirable to share.  
This whitepaper explores key components of data segmentation, circumstances for its use, 
associated benefits and challenges, various applied approaches, and the current legal 
environment shaping these endeavors.   
 
Data segmentation in the health care context can support granularity of choice with respect to the 
following: 
  
 What specific data are eligible for exchange (from individual data elements to defined 
categories of data, such as all behavioral health records); 
 Who has access to the information (from individual providers to other health care enti-
ties); 
 Under what circumstances access is granted (e.g., emergency access, treatment, etc.); and  
 For what period of time access is granted (e.g., unlimited, one-time access, etc.) 
 
Collectively, these decisions reflect a set of information management preferences that 
theoretically could be executed by a number of parties, including individual patients, health care 
providers, provider organizations, or other legal entities.  At present, however, these 
determinations are rarely made by the individual, and the question of who actually should have 
authority to determine and apply such preferences has emerged as a significant issue. 
 
The impetus for protecting personal health information through the use of data segmentation is 
partially rooted in state and federal privacy laws addressing stigma and social hostility.  
Frequently cited laws such as the federal Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient 
Records regulations (Part 2) vigorously protect specific health information from exchange 
without patient consent.  Additionally, a host of less well-recognized, but equally stringent, state 
laws protect a broad range of information, for example health data related to minors or incidents 
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 of sexual violence.  Other justifications for the use of data segmentation in protecting health data 
include long-recognized principles of patient autonomy and the need to encourage greater patient 
trust and participation in the health care system.   
 
Data segmentation provides a potential means of protecting specific elements of health 
information, both within an EHR and in broader electronic exchange environments, which can 
prove useful in implementing current legal requirements and honoring patient choice.  In 
addition, segmentation holds promise in other contexts; the electronic capture of data in 
structured fields facilitates the re-use of health data for operations, quality improvement, public 
health, and comparative effectiveness research.  
 
When discussing various data segmentation options in the health care context, several challenges 
also arise.  These include: 
 
 Technical considerations, including the use of structured data.  Legacy systems and pro-
vider documentation practices (e.g., reliance on free-text fields) often result in the re-
cording of unstructured data.  This scenario can complicate segmentation, which relies on 
the documentation of information in a structured and codified manner that can be man-
aged through the application of rules engines and other intelligence systems.   
 Defining “sensitive information.”  Pre-determining categories of information can ease the 
implementation of segmentation – both technically and logistically – but many patients 
express a strong preference for systems that enable them to convey their personal prefer-
ences more fully.   
 Consumer engagement.  Some approaches to segmentation would require and support 
deeper engagement on the part of the patient in determining and assigning segmentation 
preferences.  These require consideration not only of the capacity of patients in this re-
spect, but also their motivation to assume responsibility for the potentially daunting tasks 
associated with assigning and recording such preferences.   
 Provider reluctance.  At present, providers play a critical role in obtaining, documenting 
and honoring patient preferences with respect to personal health information.  They also 
rely on the availability of accurate and relevant health information in order to provide ap-
propriate and high-quality care.  Segmentation policies must address the needs and con-
cerns of providers as well as patients, including their concerns regarding quality and 
safety of the care provided, workflow implications, and liability.     
 
Despite these issues, and largely due to existing legal requirements, electronic exchange with 
some level of data segmentation has succeeded to varying degrees in the U.S.  The more 
developed solutions at this point are in very early stages, however, and others tend to enable 
segmentation only in contained environments.  Varied segmentation policies, practices and 
applications have emerged, including the following: 
 
 Patient-controlled segmentation models.  In these models, patient preferences are re-
corded or entered by the patient and applied as information is exchanged.  PHRs and 
health record banks are the primary examples of such models.  However, this approach 
only allows patient control over a copy of his / her health record (not the provider’s 
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 documentation) and cannot guarantee that patient preferences will be honored once the 
information is released to another entity.   
 Individual provider-controlled models.  These models allow providers to act as patient 
proxies in recording patient preferences with respect to data sharing.  Communication be-
tween patient and provider is critical to the success of these models, as is provider will-
ingness.  Some systems have successfully supported the exchange of information accord-
ing to patient preferences, but typically operate as closed systems and do not permit seg-
mentation preferences to extend to other settings.  
 Other systems, including organization-controlled models, hybrid models and innovative 
tools.  These systems often enable segmentation of information according to one or more 
jurisdictional, organizational or individual patient directive.  Pilot programs are also in 
development to enable the use of consent management systems in exchanging health in-
formation between systems.  When developing organizational policies, exchanges have 
indicated that receiving the input of key stakeholders, including consumers, is vital to 
success.   
 
Other industries and international health information exchange efforts also offer promising 
examples and insight regarding data segmentation.  Social networking sites in particular can 
illustrate how the public views privacy and the amount of granular control over personal 
information individuals generally prefer.  International health information exchange efforts also 
can offer examples of ways to approach various issues related to data segmentation. 
 
It is clear that enabling patient expression of preferences with respect to data sharing is critical to 
supporting consumer engagement.  While consumer demand for segmentation tools may not be 
high at the present time, there is growing concern over the increasing availability of health 
information, which on its own or in combination with other data types might be used in ways not 
supported by individual patients and consumers.  Notably, the advent of personalized medicine 
and increased availability of genetic information has been perceived by many as significantly 
changing the privacy discussion.  Absent the ability to segment out specific data points within an 
EHR, the only alternative may be for entire health records to be exchanged routinely.  This 
practice likely would lead consumers to engage in more privacy protective behaviors, thereby 
compromising achievement of better patient care and engagement in their health and health care.  
It could also diminish the overall utility of electronically-captured data for purposes other than 
direct care delivery. 
 
As such, it will be important for policy makers to consider various approaches to moving not 
only the discussion, but also the meaningful realization of data segmentation, forward.  Data 
segmentation efforts to date have explored a variety of approaches that show some early, but 
limited, success.  To accelerate this forward momentum, we would suggest, among other 
pursuits, the following: 
 
 Build a Bridge to Greater Autonomy: Rely on policy levers that will move us closer to the 
goal of supporting individual, subjective preferences for information management; 
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 Provide Direct Financial and Other Support to Stimulate Change: Consider various 
means of supporting  the development of segmentation-enabling processes and technolo-
gies; and  
 
 Generate Evidence: Given the significance of the transformation from paper to electronic 
means of data capture and sharing, establish and execute on a set of updated research pri-
orities.   
 
We support the idea of casting a wide net in search of appropriate means of providing patients 
more granular control over the exchange and use of their identifiable health information, and 
point to the efforts underway in other countries as evidence that this is a worthwhile endeavor.  
While still a challenge, data segmentation holds promise for accomplishing the ultimate goal of 
accommodating the needs and desires of the multiple stakeholders engaged in the electronic 
exchange of health information.
 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the context of electronic health information exchange, one of the most difficult issues 
encountered by policy makers at all levels is that of whether, and if so by what means and to 
what extent, to honor the preferences of individuals to share or withhold their health information 
from those who may benefit from its access (e.g., providers of care, public health departments).  
In our highly-fragmented health care system, these stakeholders might not ordinarily have such 
access, especially when relying on paper records for clinical documentation.   
 
Electronic health information exchange (hereinafter “electronic exchange”), whether it occurs 
via a state or other type of Health Information Organization (HIO),1 via the Nationwide Health 
Information Network (NHIN),2 or through NHIN Direct,3 is perceived as the key mechanism by 
which we will be able to better integrate (albeit virtually) health care in the U.S.  It is also widely 
believed that the use of electronic exchange is an essential condition for providing well-
coordinated, high-quality care.  That said, there continues to be vigorous debate about the role of 
the individual patient4 in determining whether and how such information should flow. 
 
On the one hand, it is widely acknowledged that information about patients and their health 
needs to go where it is needed, when it is needed, and be accessible to those who can use it to 
make important treatment and other care-related decisions.  On the other hand, there is 
recognition that, if we truly are to reap the benefits of electronic exchange, patients must be 
assured that appropriate privacy and security provisions are established and enforced.  Moreover, 
patients need to be assured that their needs and preferences are considered in the determination 
of what information is shared with other parties, for what purposes, and under what conditions.  
Implicit in this discussion is the idea that some patients may prefer to withhold or sequester 
certain elements of health information, often when it is deemed by them (or on their behalf) to be 
"sensitive."  It is in this context that the issue of data segmentation in health care arises. 
 
                                                 
1 As used in this paper, the term “HIO” means an organization that oversees and governs the exchange of health-
related information.  See The National Alliance for Health Information Technology, Report to the Office of the 
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology on Defining Key Health Information Technology Terms, 
April 28, 2008. 
2 “NHIN” refers to “a set of standards, services and policies that enable secure health information exchange over the 
Internet.” See Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology. Nationwide Health 
Information Network: An Overview. Available at: 
http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/community/healthit_hhs_gov__nationwide_health_information_network/1142 
3 “The NHIN Direct project develops specifications for a secure, scalable, standards-based way to establish universal 
health addressing and transport for participants (including providers, laboratories, hospitals, pharmacies and 
patients) to send encrypted health information directly to known, trusted recipients over the Internet.” See NHIN 
Direct. The NHIN Direct Project: What is Direct? Available at: http://nhindirect.org/. 
4 Although the terms "patient" and "consumer" are sometimes used interchangeably, for the purposes of this paper 
we generally use the word "patient" to mean a person who is engaged in the process of expressing his / her 
preferences (typically in a care setting or context) with respect to the inclusion in and / or exchange of his / her 
health information through electronic exchange.   We use the word "consumer" in particular contexts, such as 
"consumer participation" in focus groups or "consumer groups." 
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 What is Data Segmentation in the Health Care Context? 
At its core, the term “data segmentation” refers to the process of sequestering from capture, 
access or view certain data elements that are perceived by a legal entity, institution, organization, 
or individual as being undesirable to share.  This basic definition, however, does not account for 
the multiple permutations of segmentation in the health care context (i.e., granularity), nor does it 
adequately capture the varied considerations required for development of segmentation policy.  
After an initial discussion of the policy rationale for data segmentation, the core components of 
segmentation (as commonly applied in the electronic exchange context) are described below. 
 
Why Segment Health Care Data? 
State and federal laws related to sensitive health information often drive the need for data 
segmentation.  As health information is exchanged electronically, numerous laws and regulations 
that define and protect certain types of sensitive health information will apply.  Most states 
currently have laws addressing information in health records related to HIV status, mental health 
conditions and substance abuse, while some states also have laws protecting genetic 
information.5  A recent overview of health provisions in state statutes illustrates the wide variety 
of conditions that may be considered sensitive.6  The state of Illinois, for example, has statutes 
restricting access to information related to alcoholism and substance abuse, cancer, genetic test 
results, head and spinal cord injuries, HIV / AIDs, mental health and developmental disabilities, 
and STIs, while the state of Wyoming places condition-specific restrictions on information 
related to genetics, mental health and STIs.7  In addition, federal laws and regulations including 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), which provides for the 
promulgation of privacy and security regulations (the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules),8 the 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act9 and the 
federal Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records regulations (Part 2),10 among 
others, specify privacy rights related to sensitive health information. 
 
Privacy laws protecting the confidentiality of sensitive health information have long been used to 
address the stigma and social hostility associated with specific health issues, with the level of 
protection applied by law varying with respect to the type of disease at issue.11  Such laws 
typically conform to prevailing social norms concerning stigmatizing conditions and 
                                                 
5 Consumer Partnership for eHealth. Protecting Sensitive Health Information, June 2010, at 2-3. Available at:  
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/Sensitive-Data-Final_070710__2_.pdf?docID=7041. 
6 Pritts, J. et al. “The State of Health Privacy: A Comprehensive Survey of State Health Privacy Statutes,” August 8, 
1999. Available at: http://ihcrp.georgetown.edu/privacy/pdfs/statereport1.pdf (Volume 1) and 
http://ihcrp.georgetown.edu/privacy/pdfs/statereport2.pdf (Volume 2). 
7 Id. 
8 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2009).  Please see the Legal Analysis section later in this paper for a fuller discussion of 
HIPAA and the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 
9 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, Title XIII, Division A of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 13001-13424, 123 Stat. 115, 228-279 
(2009). 
10 42 C.F.R. pt. 2 (2009).  These regulations were promulgated pursuant to the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and 
Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-616, 84 Stat. 1848, and the Drug 
Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, Pub L. No. 92-255, 86 Stat. 65. The rulemaking authority granted by both 
statutes relating to confidentiality of records can now be found at 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (2006).   
11 Gostin, L.O. et.al. “The Law and the Publics Health: A Study of Infections Disease Law in the United States.” 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 99, No. 1, January 1999, pp. 59 – 128. 
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 contemporary standards regarding methods of assessment and intervention.12  In addition, 
experts note that the role of law in addressing stigma related to a health condition may change as 
the strength or power of the stigma changes.13 
 
While there is variation in the application and requirements of these laws, in general they limit 
the exchange of certain health information without patient consent,14 often quite stringently and 
explicitly.  For example, Part 2 strictly limits the disclosure and use of information regarding 
individuals in federally assisted alcohol or drug abuse treatment programs, and any information 
that could reasonably be used to identify an individual seeking or obtaining education or 
treatment is protected.15  In addition, pursuant to HITECH, patients paying out-of-pocket in full 
for treatment have the right to request that providers restrict the disclosure of their personal 
health information to health plans.16  In some states, the law even precludes disclosure of certain 
types of sensitive information in an emergency.17  Typically, the underlying purpose of such laws 
and regulations is to encourage greater participation and trust in the health care system through 
protection of a patient’s most personal and private health information, thus addressing a possible 
disincentive for seeking services.18  However, because the patchwork of laws regarding sensitive 
information in health records is neither consistent nor comprehensive, compliance can be 
challenging for those initiating electronic exchange.19   
 
In the face of this challenge, some organizations have chosen simply to exclude entire categories 
of health information from exchange, resulting in the absence of important health data in 
patients’ records.  For example, the Colorado Regional Health Information Organization 
(CORHIO), discussed in more detail later in this paper, has chosen for the near term to exclude 
from exchange any records originating from mental health clinics.  The organization attributes 
this policy decision to the perceived difficulty of separating out references to mental health that 
may appear in an individual’s record and that may require consent for disclosure.20  Data 
segmentation offers a potential solution to this dilemma by offering the possibility of 
sequestering select information from the rest of a record for purposes of exchange.  In theory, 
data segmentation is the tool that could accommodate the requirements of the current legal 
                                                 
12 Gostin, L.O. “Public Health Law Reform.” American Journal of Pubic Health, Vol. 91, No. 9, September, 2001, 
pp. 1365-68. 
13 Burris, S. “Disease Stigma in U.S. Public Health Law.” Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics,” Vol. 30, No. 2, 
Summer 2002, pp. 179-90. 
14 For the purposes of this paper, we use the term “consent” generally to refer to patient permission to include 
personal health information in and / or exchange it through electronic exchange. 
15 Goldstein, M.M. and A.L. Rein. Consumer Consent Options for Electronic Health Information Exchange:  Policy 
Considerations and Analysis,” March, 2010. Available at:  
http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_11673_911197_0_0_18/ChoiceModelFinal032610.pdf. 
16 HITECH § 13405, 123 Stat. 115, 264-265 (2009) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17935). 
17 See, e.g., Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19203, and Massachusetts, MASS GEN LAWS ch. 111, § 70F, which 
prohibit disclosure of HIV testing results even in an emergency. 
18 Pritts, J.D. “The Importance and Value of Protecting the Privacy of Health Information: The roles of the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule and the Common Rule in Health Research.” National Academy of Sciences, 2008, at 12. Available at: 
http://www.iom.edu/Activities/Research /HIPAAandResearch.aspx. 
19 Consumer Partnership for eHealth, supra note 5, at 3. 
20 Phone call with Carrie Book, Chief Information Officer, Colorado Regional Health Information Organization, 
May 19, 2010. 
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 framework while still enabling the significant benefits that result from electronic exchange to 
accrue. 
 
In addition to meeting the requirements of state and federal law, data segmentation can also be 
used to offer a fuller expression of patient preferences with respect to the sharing of personal 
health information, thus supporting underlying principles of personal autonomy and encouraging 
patient engagement.  For a variety of reasons – ranging from fear of discrimination to concern 
for physical safety – individuals may prefer to keep certain types of health information strictly 
private.21  Personal autonomy, in the context of bioethics, is the principle on which an individual 
patient’s right to make and carry out informed decisions regarding his / her health is based, 
including decisions regarding access to personal health information.22  Autonomy has been 
described as “the accepted rationale” for ensuring the confidentiality and privacy of health 
information,23 and there is considerable justification for basing policies regarding consent to the 
sharing of one’s health information on the principles of autonomous decision making.24  As such, 
patient autonomy should be a key consideration in the development of policies related to the 
electronic exchange of health records.  Segmentation could potentially provide a robust tool for 
realizing principles of personal autonomy by empowering patients with a technical means of 
protecting specific data elements within a patient’s health record. 
 
Along with supporting patient autonomy, segmentation can also build respect for patient privacy 
and trust, which are critical elements with respect to patient participation in information 
sharing.25  According to research by the California HealthCare Foundation, 15 percent of patients 
who know their information will be shared would hide information from their doctor, and 
another 33 percent would consider hiding information.26  As a result, the Consumer Partnership 
for e-Health, among other organizations, has urged consumer groups that focus on the protection 
of electronic health data to consider solutions that enhance patient trust generally, as well as 
strengthen the patient-provider relationship.27  Data segmentation, in particular segmentation at a 
granular level, could offer a means of enabling patient control over personal health information 
within an electronic environment, and may therefore hold great potential for enhancing patient 
trust and engagement in the care process. 
 
There are also legitimate medical reasons for enabling the segmentation of data within a medical 
record.  For example, studies have identified hindsight and outcome bias in the medical context –
that is, the inclination for a provider to place undue emphasis on a prior diagnosis in the record – 
                                                 
21 Goldstein, supra note 15. 
22 Goldstein, M.M. “Health Information Technology and the Idea of Informed Consent,” Journal of Law, Medicine, 
and Ethics, Vol. 38, No. 1, March 26, 2010, pp. 27-35. 
23 Terry, N.P. and L.P. Francis. “Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic Health Records,” University 
of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 2007, No. 2, February 28, 2007, pp. 681-736. 
24 Goldstein, supra note 22. 
25 See e.g., Health IT Policy Committee, Privacy and Security Tiger Team. Letter to David Blumenthal, Chairman of 
the Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT, August 19, 2010. Available at:  
http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/document/947492/tigerteamrecommendationletter8-17_2_pdf (discussing 
trust between patients and their providers as a core value to guide ONC’s work to promote HIT). 
26 California HealthCare Foundation. Consumers and Health Information Technology: A National Survey, April, 
2010. Available at: http://www.chcf.org/publications/2010/04/consumers-and-health-information-technology-a-
national-survey. 
27 Consumer Partnership for eHealth, supra note 5. 
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 as a significant contributor to medical errors.28  The ability for a patient to purge or at least 
sequester an erroneous diagnosis from a medical record could help reduce the negative outcomes 
that can occur as a result of these biases.29 
 
In addition to individual preferences or concerns about loss of privacy, segmentation plays an 
important role in the context of the broader consumer protection landscape.  One area of concern 
is that of compelled disclosure of health information for non-care related purposes.  Laws that 
address privacy (e.g., HIPAA, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 
(GINA)30) do little to address compelled disclosure of information – often health-related – for 
employment, insurance, loan and other applications.31  For example, experts have noted that it
lawful for employers to require individuals to sign authorizations of unlimited scope for the 
release of their health records as a condition of being employed.
 is 
r 
issemination.  
t that 
 
ised to 
with 
alth 
 the individual knows (such as in the case of small towns or employment in small 
ompanies).36 
ny 
32  Further, once data are 
disclosed to a non-HIPAA covered entity, there are very few legal restrictions preventing furthe
33d
 
Given the likely volume of such “compelled authorizations” per year,34 and based on the fac
greater availability of health information in electronic form will likely make it more readily
available for such disclosures, some argue that the need for increased individual control is 
heightened.  The transition from paper to electronic data capture could greatly increase the 
amount of data people may be compelled to disclose for employment, insurance, and other 
purposes.  It has been suggested that, as a direct result, medical privacy may be comprom
a degree that would have been impossible with paper records only, which are by nature 
fragmented and therefore protected to some degree by the logistical difficulty associated 
their identification and collection.35  Further, even with adequate data protection against 
unauthorized disclosure, individuals may not wish to disclose all or a large portion of their he
data, particularly in cases of sensitive data, or in situations where the data would be held by 
someone whom
c
 
What Types of Information do Patients Typically Wish to Segment? 
There has been substantial debate regarding what constitutes sensitive information, and ma
have argued that the criteria for determining which pieces of health information warrant a 
sensitive label is highly subjective.  However, in general, those who have attempted to 
distinguish sensitive information have considered it to be information that presents unusually 
                                                 
28 Henriksen, K. and H. Kaplan. “Hindsight Bias, Outcome Knowledge and Adaptive Learning,” Quality and Safety 
lth Care, Vol. 12, Suppl. II, December 1, 2003, pp 46-50. 
 Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (to be codified in 
:  Protecting Against the Greatest 
ecords:  Magnitude and 
 Journal of Bioethics, Vol. 7, No. 3, March 1, 2007, pp. 38-45. 
stein, supra note 31. 
in Hea
29 Id. 
30 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA),
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).   
31 Rothstein, M.A. and M.K. Talbott. “Compelled Disclosure of Health Information
Potential Threat to Privacy,” JAMA, Vol. 295, No. 24, June 28, 2006, pp 2882-85. 
32 Rothstein, M. A. and M.K. Talbott. “Compelled Authorizations for Disclosure of Health R
Implications,” The American
33 Roth
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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 high risks of harm to the patient in the event of disclosure.37  Such risks of harm could inclu
discrimination, social stigma, or even physical harm (for example, harm resulting from the 
release of personal health information in situations involving intimate partner violence).
de 
s for patients having a personal relationship to an individual at the relevant health care 
.39 
ive 
l health 
formation that would not be considered sensitive by statute or conventional wisdom. 
Components of Data Segmentation 
ect 
rated 
 
ble that individual preferences for 
formation sharing could be influenced by these variations. 
 
 have (and likely will continue to have) some 
uthority in this domain.  Such entities include: 
 Organizations (e.g., HIOs) 
38  Over 
time, consensus has emerged that certain categories of health information require more focused 
protection than others and, as discussed earlier, many state and federal laws have designed laws 
and policies accordingly.  Categories often considered to be sensitive include domestic violence, 
genetic information, mental health records, reproductive health records, substance abuse records, 
and record
facility
 
It is important to note, however, that it is not necessary for information to be defined as sensit
in order for it to be appropriate for segmentation.  Patients may want to segment information 
purely due to personal preferences or based on individual values.40  Also, a patient may have 
unique circumstances or sensitivities resulting in a desire to keep private certain persona
in
 
At What Level is the Information Blocked (i.e., capture, access, or view?) 
Though this has not (yet) been a source of great discussion in the context of segmentation, the 
variety of exchange models under consideration and development in the U.S. will likely aff
the stage of exchange at which segmented information is blocked.  In some exchanges, for 
example, the information shared is available in computable form and can readily be incorpo
into other data repositories.  This means that electronic copies of the information could be 
disseminated further into the health care system.  In other exchanges, the information is only
made available in a read or view-only mode.  In such a system, absent manual entry into an 
electronic health record (EHR) or other data repository, the information is not actually copied 
(and is therefore potentially less widely available).  It is possi
in
 
Who Gets to Make the Determination? 
In many discussions of data segmentation, it is presumed that individual patients should 
determine the rules and protocols for the sharing of their information.  Many consumer advocates 
view this as the ultimate goal of data segmentation, but it should be mentioned that other entities
within and surrounding the health care sector now
a
 
 Legal entities (e.g., states) 
 Institutions (e.g., hospitals) 
 
                                                 
37 Consumer Partnership for eHealth, supra note 5. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Goldstein, supra note 15. 
GW SPHHS   
Department of Health Policy 
6
 
 An individual with a history of drug and alcohol abuse, for example, may wish to authorize 
blanket consent to have any of his / her health information available to all of his / her current and 
possible care providers under any circumstance.  As described above, however, many state laws 
ipulate that certain sensitive information cannot be shared absent express consent.  Further, as 
n of numerous institutional and 
 
ace by a provider (possibly via an 
HR or other application), or by an institution or organization acting on the individual’s behalf.  
In different ways and through a variety of media, each of these methods can and have been used 
ces.   
mply 
mentation involves making choices among many options and for varying reasons.  
For this reason, most individuals and institutions prefer to establish a set of parameters around 
mit electronic exchange.  These include the 
followi
 
 
 
sonal and sensitive, another person may willingly share.  Despite this 
variation, state and federal laws, institutions and organizational entities have all – in 
hed categories of sensitive information that are afforded special or 
 
 
 
y wish 
inclusive of other providers in an emergency situation.  In addition, we know from 
oviders (e.g., doctors, nurses, pharmacists) far more 
 
 
 
                                                
st
will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper, the applicatio
organizational protocols have implications for the execution of direct patient preferences.   
 
Who Has Authority / Ability to Apply Segmentation Preferences? 
Though segmentation determinations may be intended to accommodate or address individual 
preferences with respect to information sharing, it is not (yet) typical for individuals to apply 
their preferences directly to a system or systems.  At present, this direct application model is only
accommodated by systems developed for the personally controlled health record (PCHR / PHR) 
market.  The dominant model is for preferences to be put in pl
E
to record, manage and adjudicate segmentation preferen
 
Core Components (i.e., the what, who, why and when) 
Consistent with the saying “the devil’s in the details,” so too is the way of segmentation.  Si
put, data seg
the act of segmentation that better define and li
ng: 
What data are eligible for exchange?   
Individual preferences for information sharing are highly subjective, and vary greatly
depending on personal values, perspectives, experiences, and beliefs.  What one person 
considers highly per
various ways – establis
different treatment. 
Who can gain access? 
Individual preferences also vary with respect to the determination of who they will trust
with all or certain parts of their health information.  For example, an individual ma
to share information about a rare disorder only with a specific set of health care 
providers.  Further, these preferences are likely to be highly contextual.  Extending the 
above example, that individual may alter his / her sharing preferences to be more 
research41 that patients trust their pr
than they trust other entities (e.g., employers, health insurers) with their information.
Under what circumstances (why)? 
 
41 See e.g., Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: April 2009, April 23, 2009, Publication 
#7892. Available at: http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/7892.cfm. 
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 Another factor influencing individual preference with regard to segmentation is the 
purpose of information sharing.  That is, for what reason does the requesting (or 
permitted) party desire the information?  Survey data have shown that a large majority o
the public wants electronic access to their health information – both for themselves and 
for their health providers – because they believe such access is likely to increase the 
quality of their health care.
f 
 
 
1 
ses if it 
rch 
purposes.   Interestingly, one recent study of PHR users found that respondents were 
onal health information for research purposes when provided 
 
 
h 
ent 
 their 
history of substance abuse may, having recently spent time in a rehabilitation facility, 
tion captured during that time period in order to 
er 
to Michael O. Leavitt, then Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
.”49  
42  By comparison, a significant proportion would object to
exchange of that same information if it were to be used for other purposes.  Data from a
2006 survey in which Americans were asked about the benefits and concerns of online 
health information reveal that 77 percent were “very concerned” about their medical 
information being used for marketing purposes.43  A recent Canadian study also found 
that the willingness to share data decreases when data will be used for commercial, for-
profit use and marketing.44  In addition, a study by Johns Hopkins in 2003 found that 3
percent of respondents were willing to share medical records for research purpo
would increase medical knowledge, but over 50 percent of those same respondents were 
unwilling to allow the use of their records in research without consent.45  However, a 
2006 survey commissioned by the Markle Foundation found that 75 percent of 
respondents were willing to share de-identified personal health information for resea
46
more willing to share pers
with some amount of granular control over which information would be shared.47    
For what period of time? 
The final core component of segmentation is the issue of time frame or duration.  Thoug
less frequently discussed in the literature than other aspects of segmentation, this elem
refers to the possibility that individuals would prefer to segment out certain parts of
health care record from a specified period of time.48  For example, an individual with a 
wish to segment all health informa
prevent it from being shared with other non-facility providers. 
 
The Public Data Segmentation Debate 
On June 22, 2006, the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS) sent a lett
(HHS), entitled “Privacy and Confidentiality in the Nationwide Health Information Network
                                                 
42 Markle Foundation. Survey Finds Americans Want Electronic Personal Health Information to Improve Own 
Health Care, November 2006. Available at: http://www.markle.org/downloadable_assets/research_doc_120706.pdf. 
or Use of Personal Information for Health Research: Do People With Potentially 
 Conditions and the General Public Differ in Their Opinions?” BMC Medical Ethics, Vol. 10, 
ower and Potential of 
ivacyePrimer.pdf
43 Id. 
44 Willison D.J. et al. “Consent f
Stigmatizing Health
No. 10, July 24, 2009, pp 1-12. 
45 Terry, supra 23. 
46 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Project HealthDesign E-Primer 2: Rethinking the P
Personal Health Records, December 2007. Available at:  
http://www.projecthealthdesign.org/media/file/ProjectHealthDesignPr . 
ring Medical Data for Health Research: The Early Personal Health Record Experience,” 
th and Human Services re: Recommendations Regarding Privacy and 
47 Weitzman, E.R. et al. “Sha
Journal of Medical Internet Research, Vol. 12, No. 2, May 25, 2010. 
48 Goldstein, supra note 15. 
49 NCVHS. Letter to the Secretary of Heal
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 The letter recommended that HHS should “assess the desirability and feasibility of allowing 
individuals to control access to the specific content of their health records via the NHIN, and
so, by what appropriate means.  Decisions about whether individ
, if 
uals should have this right 
ould be based on an open, transparent, and public process.”50 
 
s 
 
HIN, 
he 
pes of data that might be subject to special treatment, and the level of granularity permitted. 
ue 
 
ve health information disclosed via the NHIN.”52  This system would require the 
llowing: 
; 
ed health information; 
 Establishment of provisions for emergency access to all of an individual’s health information. 
ecifics of these policies, and that pilot projects should be initiated to test their implementation.   
mentation 
formation 
                                                                                                                                                            
sh
 
In an effort to provide policy makers with greater detail regarding its recommendations, the 
NCVHS Subcommittee on Privacy, Confidentiality and Security (Subcommittee) conducted
hearings on April 17, 2007.  Testimony was presented by experts in several of the medical 
professional fields that are thought of as handling particularly sensitive health information, a
well as others with relevant expertise.  NCVHS engaged in extensive deliberations on these 
matters, which culminated in a series of recommendations submitted to the Secretary in February
of 2008.51  It should be noted that NCVHS’s deliberations considered the issue of segmentation 
(referred to by the group as “sequestering”) in the limited context of exchange within the N
and for treatment purposes only.  That said, the group’s discussion and recommendations 
referenced several components outlined above, such as the desired level of individual control, t
ty
 
The recommendations made by NCVHS were intended to strike a balance between the uniq
desires expressed by individuals and the necessity to account for other interests and policy 
considerations as well as the feasibility of implementation.  The advisory body concluded that 
“NHIN policies should permit individuals limited control, in a uniform manner, over access to
their sensiti
fo
 
 Identification of categories of sensitive health information
 Allowance of optional sequestering of certain categories; 
 Inclusion of notations to health care providers of sequester
 Implementation of computer-based decision support; and 

 
The group also recommended that a public dialogue should be undertaken to develop the 
sp
 
On June 15, 2010 the Subcommittee held a hearing to discuss further the issue of sensitive 
information in medical records.  While the 2008 recommendations issued by NCVHS provided 
five examples of categories of sensitive information that would be appropriate for seg
(domestic violence, mental health, reproductive health, substance abuse and genetic 
information), the Subcommittee felt the need to explore these and other categories of in
 
y in the National Health Information Network, June 22, 2006. Available at:  Confidentialit
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/060622lt.htm. 
50 Id. at R-6. 
51 NCVHS. Letter to the Secretary of Health and Human Services re: Individual Control of Sensitive Health 
 via the Nationwide Health Information Network for Purposes of Treatment, February 20, 2008. Information
Available at: http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/080220lt.pdf. 
52 Id. at 2. 
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 that may deserve special protection further.53  In this latest hearing, the Subcommittee 
specifically considered genetic information, mental health information, the health information of 
hildren and adolescents and other sensitive information, such as the health records of VIPs and 
ted 
nsored a Consumer Choice Technology Hearing.   
he hearing focused on the use of technology to implement individual choice, examining both its 
ons 
y 
trate 
ntil such 
 technical solution is developed and uniformly applied, it is critically important to educate 
patients regarding the extent to which their preferences realistically can be honored.62 
EALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY LAWS THAT DRIVE THE NEED TO SEGMENT 
 
c
of young adults covered under a parent’s insurance policy.54 
 
Discussion and examination of issues related to data segmentation have also occurred under the 
auspices of the Health Information Technology Policy Committee (HIT Policy Committee), a 
Federal Advisory Committee formed to make recommendations to the National Coordinator for 
Health Information Technology on HIT policy issues.55  In the HITECH Act, Congress instruc
the HIT Policy Committee to make recommendations with respect to data segmentation;56 as part 
of that consideration, on June 29, 2010, the Privacy and Security Tiger Team (Tiger Team), a 
workgroup of the HIT Policy Committee, spo 57
T
capabilities and limitations in that respect.   
 
Additionally, the HIT Policy Committee directed the Tiger Team to focus on a series of questi
related to the exchange of personally identifiable health information.58  One issue examined b
the Tiger Team at the request of the Office of the National Coordinator (ONC) has been “the 
ability of technology to support more granular patient consents (i.e., authorizing exchange of 
specific pieces of information while excluding other records).”59  Draft recommendations by the 
Tiger Team with respect to this issue conclude that technology enabling granular segmentation is 
promising, but still in the early stages of development, thus necessitating further exploration and 
innovation.60  The recommendations stress that a successful technical solution must demons
effective use by patients and fulfillment of patient expectations.61  They also note that u
a
 
H
DATA 
 
This section generally describes the legal environment in which data segmentation in electronic
exchange is developing, but is not intended to be a comprehensive legal review.  Numerous and 
varied laws, both state and federal, form the structure of this environment, but it is beyond the 
                                                 
53 NCVHS. Hearing of the Subcommittee on Privacy, Confidentiality and Security: Sensitive Information in Medical 
Records, June 15, 2010. Available at: http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/100615tr.htm#introduction. 
54 Id. 
55 HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13101, 123 Stat. 115, 228-230 (2009) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 300jj-11). 
56 HITECH § 13101. 
57 Health IT Policy Committee, Privacy and Security Tiger Team. Consumer Choice Technology Hearing Transcript, 
June 29, 2010. Available at: 
http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_11673_945903_0_0_18/Consumer-Choice-Technology-
Hearing-062910.pdf. 
58 Health IT Policy Committee, Privacy and Security Tiger Team, supra note 25. 
59 Id. at 4.  
60 Id. at 16. 
61 Id. at 15. 
62 Id. at 12. 
GW SPHHS   
Department of Health Policy 
10
 
 scope of this paper to review all of these laws.  Instead, select individual statutes and regulations 
will be examined along with certain specific health conditions or types of data that are g
considered sensitive and therefore protected by legislation.  The section will also explore so
the types of health records most commonly protected by state laws, including mental health 
HIV-related records, as well as a few topics addressed less frequently in discussions of 
segmentation, such as intimate partner violence.  Despite the considerable variation in the 
applicable state and federal laws, however, they do have a common, overarching pu
enerally 
me of 
and 
rpose—
ncouraging and enhancing patient participation in the health care system.  By constructing a 
vironment for sensitive health information, privacy protective behavior by 
atients, such as avoiding treatment for a sensitive health issue, may be lessened.   
g 
 of 
tion by the 
atient except under very limited circumstances.   In cases such as these, the information at 
 
ssary 
 a health 
 the 
onstrained by the minimum 
ecessary requirement.  If the entity exchanges PHI for purposes more accurately described as 
 
e
protective legal en
p
 
Individual Laws 
 
HIPAA and the Privacy Rule 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule is the key federal law that shapes the legal environment underlyin
data segmentation in electronic exchange.63  The Privacy Rule generally allows the disclosure
protected health information (PHI) 64 for the purpose of treatment, payment or health care 
operations without the express permission of the patient.  There are exceptions to this rule, 
however.  For example, release of psychotherapy notes requires specific authoriza
65p
issue (e.g., psychotherapy notes) may need to be segmented from other clinical data in order to
maintain the privacy of the information and protect it from unlawful disclosure.   
 
The Privacy Rule’s “minimum necessary” requirement may also hold particular relevance for 
segmentation of data in electronic exchange.  The Rule requires covered entities to take 
reasonable steps to limit the use or disclosure of and requests for PHI to the minimum nece
to accomplish the intended purpose,66 but does not apply to disclosures to or requests by
care provider for treatment purposes, or to disclosures to the individual who is the subject of
information.67  Thus, the amount and type of information that an entity may appropriately 
exchange may vary with the intended purpose of the disclosure.  If an entity exchanges 
information for treatment purposes only, its operations are not c
n
payment or health care operations (or other permitted purposes), however, it may be necessary to
segment the data to meet the minimum necessary standards.    
 
                                                 
63 For a discussion of HIPAA’s basic structure, see Goldstein, supra note 15. 
64 The Privacy Rule defines protected health information as “individually identifiable health information” that is 
held or transmitted by a covered entity in any form, including electronic, paper, and oral media, subject to certain 
 in 
 
7 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17953).  Final recommendations / conclusions on 
. 
limited exceptions (such as the exclusion of employment records).  45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2009).   
65 Exceptions include use by the originator of the psychotherapy notes in treatment, use by the covered entity
specific types of training programs and use by the covered entity in defending a legal action brought by the 
individual patient. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (a)(2).  HITECH directed the Secretary of HHS to examine the definition of
psychotherapy notes with regard to including test data related to mental health evaluations.  HITECH, Pub. L. No. 
111-5, § 13424(f), 123 Stat. 115, 27
the issue have not yet been issued. 
66 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) (2009). 
67 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) (2009)
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 Finally, it is important to note that HIPAA provides a baseline standard of privacy protection for 
health information—federal and state laws that offer more stringent privacy protections are not 
perseded by the Privacy Rule.68  A considerable body of privacy law at the state level currently 
d, as a result, an entity’s decisions regarding data segmentation will likely be affected 
ects 
n in 
nt 
ose related to treatment.  In order to comply with this provision, an 
ore may need to develop a segmentation mechanism by which a person’s 
es 
 
f 
 
, 
and communicating that information for care purposes and quality reporting.   Stages 2 and 3 
                                                
su
exists69 an
by state privacy laws.   
 
HITECH 
The HITECH Act recently amended HIPAA by expanding its reach, strengthening certain asp
of the regulations, and increasing federal enforcement tools.70  Regulations implementing the 
law’s provisions are currently being promulgated, some of which will affect data segmentatio
electronic exchange directly.  For example, providers now must honor a patient’s request to 
restrict disclosure of PHI related to treatment or services for which the patient has paid out-of-
pocket where the purpose of the disclosure is for payment or health care purposes and is not 
otherwise required by law.71  The provision does not apply to disclosures made for treatme
purposes.  Thus, for example if an individual paid cash for treatment of a sexually transmitted 
disease, he or she has the right to prohibit disclosures for payment or health care operations 
purposes but not for th
exchange theref
information could be exchanged for treatment purposes, but not for payment or health care 
operations purposes. 
  
In addition to expanding the privacy protections of HIPAA, HITECH created an incentive 
program “for adoption and meaningful use of certified EHR technology” that will impact choic
regarding the creation of electronic exchange systems.72  The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS) recently issued a final rule outlining key concepts regarding meaningful use o
EHR technology and providing a definition of meaningful use.73  The rule will phase in more 
robust criteria in three stages, with the first stage beginning in 2011 and focusing on capturing
health information in a coded format, tracking health information and key clinical conditions
74
 
ation Technology in the 
thal, D. et al. eds., 2008). Available at: 
68 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2009). 
69 Goldstein, M.M. et al. Emerging Issues in Health Information Privacy, in “Health Inform
United States: Where We Stand, 2008” (Blumen
http://www.rwjf.org/pr/product.jsp?id=31831. 
70 HITECH Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 13101-13424, 123 Stat. 115, 228-279 (2009). 
71 HITECH § 13405, 123 Stat. at 264-265 (2009) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17935); see also Modifications t
HIPAA Privacy, Security and Enforcement Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health
o the 
 Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 40867, 40899 - 40901 (proposed July 14, 2010) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. Parts 
he 
eive 
h 
 for 
ter=3564
160 and 164). 
72 HITECH, Title IV, Division B, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 4101-4201, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
73 Medicaid and Medicare Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program; Final Rule, 42 C.F.R. Parts 412, 
413, 422 and 495, et al., 75 Fed. Reg. 44314, July 28, 2010.   Additionally, ONC issued a final rule describing t
certification criteria an EHR must meet in order for eligible providers and hospitals using the EHR to rec
meaningful use payments.  In creating the rule, ONC made an effort to align standards, implementation 
specifications, and certification criteria with the final meaningful use Stage 1 objectives and measures. See Healt
Information Technology:  Initial Set of Standards, Implementation Specifications, and Certification Criteria
Electronic Health Record Technology; Final Rule, 45 C.F.R. Part 170, 75 Fed. Reg. 44589, July 28, 2010. 
74 CMS Press Release. CMS Proposes Definition of Meaningful Use of Certified Electronic Health Records (EHR) 
Technology, December 30, 2009. Available at: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Coun . 
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 will expand on the Stage 1 criteria and, according to some experts, criteria in all three stages 
should enable progress in standardization.75  As discussed in more detail later in this paper, 
structured and standardized data such as that captured in coded format enable both segmentation 
dards development, including required 
technologies that can protect the privacy and security of health information, such as technical 
l 
hat 
t 
th 
teria 
als 
se 
reestanding 
rograms and programs that are part of larger organizations, for example a detoxification unit in 
 with 
nnect 
of sensitive information and, ultimately, its exchange across disparate systems. 
 
Finally, HITECH lists areas of consideration for stan
solutions allowing segmentation of sensitive data.76 
Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records (Part 2) 
Federal regulations promulgated in the early 1970’s to protect the identities of persons in alcoho
or drug abuse treatment programs77 also affect the legal environment in which the electronic 
exchange of health information will occur.  These laws were intended to assure individuals t
information related to substance abuse treatment would be kept private, recognizing that withou
such assurances, many patients would choose not to seek treatment for these serious heal
issues.78  According to experts, research indicates that 95 percent of people meeting the cri
for substance abuse dependency do not perceive a need for help, and patient trust in the 
confidentiality of services is critical in order to enlist patients in treatment programs.79  In 
keeping with this view, Part 2 strictly limits disclosure and use of information about individu
seeking or obtaining diagnosis, referral or treatment in federally assisted alcohol or drug abu
treatment programs.80  Any and all information that might reasonably be used to identify an 
individual is protected by Part 2, and all permissible disclosures are limited to information 
necessary to carry out the purpose of the disclosure.81  The regulations apply both to f
p
a general hospital or a substance abuse clinic in a county mental health department.82 
 
Nearly all disclosures allowed under Part 2 require specific patient consent.83  This paradigm 
might require the segmentation of relevant data in order to ensure its protection and compliance 
with the law,84 particularly in situations where a treatment program is part of a larger entity
multiple departments generating data for the same patient.  Any information that could co
the patient to the substance abuse treatment program must not be released without proper 
                                                 
75 Phone call with Dr. Ben Adida, Lead Architect and Investigator, Indivo PCHR Project, March 11, 2010. 
76 HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13101, 123 Stat. 228, 230 (2009) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 300jj-11). 
77 42 C.F.R. pt. 2 (2009). 
78 H. REP. NO. 92-775, at 24 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2045, 2072. 
79 Westley, H.C. “Federal Substance Use Disorder Confidentiality,” SAMHSA, April 15, 2010, at 31, 40. Available at: 
http://www.samhsa.gov/presentations/Clark_42cfrpart2vFINALupdated.ppt. 
80 42 C.F.R. § 2.3(a). 
81 42 C.F.R. §§  2.11, 2.13(a).  For more detail on the basic structure of Part 2, see Goldstein, supra note 15.  In 
addition, Part 2 defines disclosure as a communication or verification of patient identifying information, which can 
include names, addresses, Social Security numbers, fingerprints, photographs, or similar information by which the 
identity of a patient can be determined.  The regulations’ requirements apply to individuals or entities that hold 
themselves out and actually provide alcohol or drug abuse diagnosis, treatment, or referral for treatment, as well as 
to medical personnel or staff whose primary function is the provision of alcohol or drug abuse diagnosis, treatment, 
or referral for treatment.   
8242 C.F.R. § 2.11. 
83 42 C.F.R. § 2.32. 
84 Id. 
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 consent.  In addition, Part 2 generally prohibits anyone who receives information from
substance abuse
 a 
 program from re-disclosing it, and requires that any information released must 
be accompanied by a written notice informing the recipient that federal law prohibits its re-
ike HIPAA, Part 2 sets a federal privacy floor.  State laws that are less protective regarding 
als in federally assisted alcohol or drug abuse 
eatment programs are preempted, while state laws that are more stringent are preserved.86 
 
nd 
 
cords generated in other hospital departments.  
dditionally, state laws might also contain provisions preventing re-disclosure of behavioral 
nsent, necessitating a means of addressing the flow of records to third 
another area of legal 
omplexity with respect to data segmentation in electronic exchange.  Depending on state law, 
f 
r 
other law allows the minor to consent to a health care procedure, and where the minor does in 
                                        
disclosure unless expressly permitted by the patient or as otherwise authorized by the 
regulations.85   
 
L
disclosure and use of information about individu
tr
 
Protecting Select Conditions / Types of Data 
 
Mental Health 
State laws typically provide greater protection to in-patient mental health information than to 
health information generated in other settings, thereby producing data segmentation challenges
for system developers in both policy setting (i.e., accommodating varied systems of law) a
technological implementation.87  Under the most stringent laws, mental health records may only 
be disclosed without consent in the case of emergencies.88  As in the case of Part 2, such laws
therefore might require hospitals that have in-patient mental health wards to treat records 
generated in such wards differently than re
A
health records without co
parties once they have been released.89     
 
Data Regarding Minors 
Access by parents to the health records of minor children presents 
c
which can vary considerably, data systems may be required to segment the health information o
minors in a way that will prevent unlawful disclosure to a parent. 
 
HIPAA also includes several important exceptions regarding the disclosure of PHI to personal 
representatives, including the disclosure of information related to the health records of minors.  
Pursuant to the Privacy Rule, a parent is generally considered the personal representative of a 
minor.90  As such, the parent generally has access to and control over that minor’s health care 
record.91  There are circumstances, however, under which the parent will not be considered the 
minor’s personal representative under HIPAA, including, for example, where relevant state o
         
 to Disclose Health Information,” August 2009. AHRQ Contract No. 290-
ww.healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_10741_910326_0_0_18/DisclosureReport.pdf
85 Id. 
86 42 C.F.R. § 2.20 (2009). 
87 Pritts, J. et al. “Privacy and Security Solutions for Interoperable Health Information Exchange: Report on State 
Law Requirements for Patient Permission
02-0015, RTI International. Available at: 
http://w . 
.F.R.§ 164.502(g)(3)(i). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
9045 C
91Id. 
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 fact give consent.92  While considerable variation exists, where a minor is allowed to consent to
procedure under state law, some states allow the minor to control access to medical records 
related to that procedure.  New York law, for example, allows minors to consent to a variety o
medical procedures and, where a minor has consented to a procedure, the law prevents the 
disclosure of information related to that procedure without the m 93
 a 
f 
inor’s consent.   Similarly, 
ashington, DC law allows a minor of any age to consent to a limited amount of outpatient 
 of 
be instances where a covered entity must separate a minor’s health care records in 
rder to prevent disclosure of the records to a personal representative who could cause harm to 
 for 
 
er 
ords 
cription 
er 
“guidance to jurisdictions in creating and implementing their own protocols, as well as 
                                                
W
treatment for mental health and protects the related records.94   
 
Another important exception to HIPAA’s general rule of parental access to the health records
minors applies in the case of abuse, neglect or endangerment.  Pursuant to the Privacy Rule, 
covered entities are allowed on a case-by-case basis to prevent disclosure of an individual’s 
health record to a personal representative in order to protect the individual involved.95  There 
may therefore 
o
the minor.96   
 
Intimate Partner Violence and Sexual Violence 
Intimate partner violence (IPV) and sexual violence (SV) have also been the subject of state and 
federal efforts to address the privacy of medical records.  For example, the Violence Against 
Women Act of 2000 required the Department of Justice (DOJ) to develop national protocols
sexual assault medical forensic examinations.97  The resulting protocols recognized that victims
of sexual violence may avoid seeking assistance or treatment after an attack due to stigma, 
embarrassment, fear of assailants or other reasons.98  As such, a recommendation was included 
that forensic exam records should be maintained separately from other medical records in ord
to preserve confidentiality.99  Further, the protocols noted that restricting access to such rec
is particularly important in small and rural communities where hospital workers may know the 
patient or the suspect.100  Sexual assault forensic exams, also known as rape kits, typically 
include a physical examination, toxicology labs, STI and pregnancy testing, and the pres
of medication.  The protocols developed by the DOJ apply to every state and are meant to off
 
ights in New York 
ion Reproductive Rights Project, July 2002. Available at: 
9245 C.F.R.§ 164.502(g)(3)(i)(a). 
93 Feierman, J. et al. “Teenagers, Health Care and the Law: A Guide to the Law On Minors’ R
State,” New York Civil Liberties Un
http://www.nyclu.org/files/thl.pdf. 
94 D.C. CODE § 7-1231.14(b) (2008); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 22, § 600.7 (2008); D.C. CODE §§ 7-1202.01 (2008). 
.  
iliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 931(b)(1), 95 
 of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 
or Sexual Assault Medical 
itiative, September 2004. Available at: 
ww.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ovw/206554.pdf
95 45 C.F.R. 164.502(g)(5) 
96 Title X of the Public Health Service Act provides public funding for family planning services (42 USC § 300)
While Title X mandates that all services are provided confidentially, including services provided to minors (42 
C.F.R. § 59.11), the regulations require grantees to encourage the involvement of parents in a minor’s decision to 
seek family planning services. (Omnibus Budget Reconc
Stat. 570 (1981) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1991)) 
97 Violence Against Women Act, Div. B, Title IV
Pub. L. 106-386 §1405, 114 Stat. 1515 (2000). 
98 U.S. Department of Justice, Office on Violence Against Women. “A National Protocol f
Forensic Examinations,” at 90 President’s DNA In
http://w . 
99 Id.  
100 Id.   
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 recommending specific procedures related to the exam process."101  As a result, a number of 
states, including Alaska, Missouri and New Jersey,102 have developed protocols and guidelines 
with language recommending that sexual assault forensic exam records be maintained separately.    
 
view 
ing any 
 for 
 
g 
g that occurs in the context of HIV testing must be kept confidential 
ithin medical records.105   
tion 
r 
 limits 
s 
 an 
                                                
 
While IPV hospital examination protocols generally recommend detailed documentation of
incidents in the medical record, there is also recognition of the importance of ensuring the 
privacy of those health records.  For example, the state of Iowa requires that hospitals inter
IPV victims in private and maintain the confidentiality of the related health records.103  In 
addition, testimony at a recent NCVHS meeting stressed the critical importance of protect
information in a health record that may reveal the location of an IPV victim to ensure the 
victim’s safety.104  This protection requires attention not only to information being disclosed
treatment purposes, but also to information that may be disclosed for payment or operation
purposes.  Additionally, as health interventions are beginning to focus on the relationship 
between IPV and HIV, screenings for IPV are increasingly included as elements of HIV testin
programs.  Some state laws regarding HIV testing, such as the law in New York, specifically 
require that any IPV screenin
w
 
Genetic Information 
Because of the unique nature of genetic information and the increasing use of such informa
for a variety of purposes, protecting the privacy of this data is a growing concern.106  Both 
federal and state laws have begun to address the issue in a variety of ways.  GINA focuses on 
protecting individuals from discrimination by employers or health insurers on the basis of thei
genetic information.107  Title I of GINA prevents group health plans and health insurers from 
basing premiums on genetic information, using genetic information as a basis for determining 
eligibility, or requiring that individuals undergo genetic testing.108  Title II of GINA strictly
an employer’s right to request, require, or purchase an employee’s genetic information.109  
Although the scope of GINA’s protection is broad, the law does not apply to benefits such a
long-term care, disability, and life insurance.110  However, because GINA defines “genetic 
information” as information about an individual’s genetic tests, as well as the genetic tests of
 
101 Id. at 14. 
102 See, e.g., Alaska Department of Public Safety. Alaska Statewide Protocols for Sexual Assault Response 
Teams. Available at: www.dps.state.ak.us/Ast/docs/SARTProtocols.pdf; Missouri Department of Public 
Safety. Sexual Assault Forensic Examination (SAFE) Program Report Form. Available 
at: www.dps.mo.gov/dir/programs/safe/documents/SAFEForms.pdf; New Jersey Department of Law and Public 
Safety. Attorney General Standards for Providing Services to Victims of Sexual Assault. Available 
at: www.njdcj.org/agguide/standards/standardssartsane.pdf. 
103 IOWA ADMIN. CODE  r. 481-51.7(3) (2008). 
104 NCVHS, supra note 53. 
105 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 63 (2008).  
106 NCVHS, supra note 53. 
107 GINA, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 
U.S.C.). 
108 GINA §§ 101-106, 122 Stat. at 883-905. 
109 GINA §§ 201-213, 122 Stat. at 905-920.  Experts have noted that, with the passage of health reform legislation 
addressing discrimination by health insurance companies on the basis of genetic information, Title I of GINA may 
have lost its significance so that only Title II remains relevant today.  See comments of Mark Rothstein, NCVHS, 
supra note 53. 
110 GINA §§ 201-213. 
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 individual’s family members or the manifestation of a disease or disorder in an individual’s 
family members,111 it prevents the use of family medical histories in employment and insurance 
ecisions in addition to genetic information about the individual.112 
 have 
 
t 
onsent for the release of information for treatment purposes even in the case an emergency.115 
e of 
ed to 
g an 
f an 
o has received a genetic test be protected from disclosure by encryption or 
ncoding.118 
by 
a public health department, while in other states it may apply more broadly to any health care 
                                                
d
 
State laws regarding genetic information generally have focused on protecting patients from the 
use of such information by health insurers to deny coverage, although a minority of states
laws regarding genetic information that are broad enough to encompass the disclosure of 
information by health care providers.113  These laws may apply solely to genetic testing, or may 
apply more broadly to genetics-related information, including information such as family health 
history or inherited characteristics.114  State laws related to genetic information also vary in their
consent requirements for information disclosure purposes: some require an individual’s consen
for disclosures for treatment purposes, while others do not.  A small minority of states require 
c
 
Despite the variation in state law, it is clear that the legal environment surrounding disclosur
genetic information recognizes the sensitive nature of such information and increasingly is 
making attempts to protect it.  Accordingly, some experts have indicated that the increasing 
prevalence of genetic information in individuals’ health records may increase an HIO’s ne
consider methods of protecting that information.116  For example, testimony at the recent 
NCVHS hearing on sensitive information discussed the potential use of genetic information in 
the context of an individual with a behavioral health condition.117  If an HIO chooses to include 
genetic information in electronic exchange, it may need to be capable not only of sequesterin
individual’s genetic information, but also the genetic information and medical history of an 
individual’s family members.  For example, Massachusetts law requires that the identity o
individual wh
e
 
HIV-Related Information 
While most states have laws restricting the disclosure of information related to HIV, the scope of 
these laws can widely vary.  In some states, the law may apply only to information maintained 
 
111 GINA § 201, 122 Stat. at 906.  Analysts have observed that, by providing a statutory definition of genetic 
information (which thereby defines what is sensitive and thereby deserves protection), GINA could serve as a 
starting point for creation of appropriate segmentation policies for sensitive data.  NCVHS, supra note 53. 
112 Office for Human Research Protections, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Guidance on the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act: Implications for Investigators and Institutional Review Boards, March 
24, 2009. Available at http://www/hhs/gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/gina.html. 
113 Pritts, supra note 87. 
114 Id. See, e.g., Tex. Occ. Code 58.001(2007) and N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-47(a),(b) (2008) 
115 Pritts, supra note 87. 
116 Phone call with Dixie Baker, Chair of Privacy and Security Workgroup, Health IT Standards Committee and 
Member, Privacy and Security Workgroup, Health IT Policy Committee, May 3, 2010. 
117 NCVHS, supra note 53, at 13. 
118 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111 § 70G (West 2009).  Rather than create an encryption or encoding system, 
MAeHC excluded genetic information entirely from the exchange.  Additionally, MAeHC decided not to include 
free text notes of any kind in the exchange, recognizing the difficulty of extracting family history information, for 
example, from free text fields.  See phone call with Nael Hafez, Senior Pilot Executive, and Barbara Lund, Director 
of Technical Services, Massachusetts e-Health Collaborative, April 22, 1010. 
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 provider.119  In at least 16 states, laws and regulations also prohibit re-disclosure of HIV-related 
information, with some states requiring that written notice regarding the confidentiality of the 
information released accompany any such disclosure.120  Also, at least 19 states have laws 
protecting HIV-related information that may be broad enough to cover the disclosure of 
information regarding medications that could be used to identify an individual as having HIV as 
well.121  For example, Connecticut law protects “any confidential HIV-related information,”122 
defined as including any information “pertaining to” a person with HIV or relating to that 
person’s sexual partners—including information that reasonably could identify an individual as 
having HIV.123  Such laws recognize the capacity of information beyond test results to indicate 
that an individual may have HIV and the resulting need to restrict access to such information in 
order to protect the confidentiality of an individual’s HIV status.  Many of the experts 
interviewed for this paper specifically mentioned the possible downstream inferences that could 
be made from the inclusion of such data in an EHR when discussing challenges for developers of 
data segmentation systems. 
 
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN ADVANCING DATA SEGMENTATION 
 
As discussed above, there are multiple permutations of data segmentation in the health care 
context, and just as many perspectives on whether, or to what extent, it should be enabled or 
discouraged.  This variation is in part due to the fact that multiple interrelated considerations, 
both technical and non-technical, surface when deliberating this issue.  At one end of the 
spectrum, enabling the complete and meaningful accommodation of individual preferences may 
require significant technical advances that, while potentially feasible, are not well supported or 
enabled by the broader health care system.  Conversely, disregard for such preferences (as stated 
either directly by individuals or on their behalf) may impact stakeholder participation and 
certainly could violate legal requirements and other policy directives. 
 
One of the major benefits of converting from paper to electronic means of capturing information 
is that it makes the task of sharing that information between providers, patients, and other 
interested and appropriate parties, at least theoretically, much easier—it is relatively simple to 
make copies of electronic data from EHRs and other data sources, and the transmission of that 
information can be instantaneous124 and performed at low or no cost.  Further, information 
recorded in structured fields within an EHR is easier to categorize and sort accordingly, which 
helps enable segmentation where desired.  By contrast, segmenting information within paper 
records (which may be performed to fulfill the minimum necessary requirement of HIPAA, for 
example) typically requires redaction of information by hand because whatever is written on a 
single sheet of paper necessarily is associated with all other information on that paper.  If one 
merges all of the single pieces of paper on an individual with co-morbid conditions, even from 
only one provider’s office, the volume quickly becomes unwieldy and non-portable, which 
means that it cannot be used as effectively to support care delivery and coordination processes. 
                                                 
119 Pritts, supra note 87. 
120 Id. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 381.004 (2008) 
121 Pritts, supra note 87; see, e.g., 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7603 (West 2010). 
122 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-591 (2009). 
123 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a -581 (7), (8) (2009). 
124 Consumer Partnership for eHealth, supra note 5. 
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 In addition, not only is the adoption of, or conversion to, systems that support data segmentation 
in the best interest of individual patients who want to express their information management 
preferences, but it is also critical to supporting the goal of improving our health care system.  
Several initiatives, including those discussed at a recent Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
workshop,125 for example, have focused on the importance of leveraging HIT systems to 
generate more and better information that can be used to support rapid learning within health 
care.  With the goal of fostering an environment that yields continuous quality improvement,
workshop organizers pointed out the importance of capturing electronically nearly all clinical 
(and other relevant) health data in such a way that it can be leveraged, not only for the provision 
of quality care, but also for a variety of other “secondary” purposes, such as public health 
surveillance, disease modeling, and comparative effectiveness research.  This priority is also 
evidenced in many provisions of the HITECH Act, as well as the broader health care reform 
legislation 126
 
 of 2010.  
                                                
 
Although systems supporting electronic data capture are better able to support these objectives, 
data segmentation is still viewed by some analysts as problematic, infeasible, and possible only 
at some point in the future.  Perhaps this skepticism is based on the reality that, at this point in 
the transition from paper to electronic collection and exchange of health information, we are 
forced to accommodate the challenges posed by both.  That is, we still work in a mostly-paper 
world and have developed complex processes to support that environment, but we 
simultaneously are trying to evolve to a different medium that requires critical examination and 
often replacement of those entrenched processes.  Interestingly, many experts believe that the 
technical issues involved in the development of electronic data capture and exchange, while 
significant, pose far less of a challenge than others discussed in this paper, including policy 
considerations, the absence of standard data definitions and terminologies, entrenched 
institutional and provider practices, and consumer capacity issues.  That is not to say that the 
technology isn’t critically important, but rather that highly granular segmentation is indeed 
technically feasible—assuming that the other issues are addressed as well.   
 
Outlined below are five key challenge areas associated with the segmentation of health 
information in the context of electronic exchange.  They are presented in no particular order of 
importance or significance, and each merits thoughtful consideration and evaluation—both at the 
broad policy level and as applied to a particular exchange initiative.  It should also be noted that 
 
125 Institute of Medicine. “Electronic Infrastructure for the Learning Healthcare System: The Road to Continuous 
Improvement in Health and Health Care. Workshop #1: Opportunities, Challenges, Priorities.”  Sponsored by: Office 
of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, July 27-28, 2010. Available at: 
http://www.nationalehealth.org/ShowContent.aspx?id=436. 
126 See, e.g., HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13101, 123 Stat. 115, 230 (2009) (to be codified at 42 USC 300jj-11) 
(requiring development of a nationwide health information technology infrastructure that allows for the electronic 
use and exchange of information in a way that improves health care quality, reduces medical errors and advances the 
delivery of patient-centered medical care, as well as improves public health activities and facilitates identification of 
and response to public health threats); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
3002(d), 124 Stat. 119, 363 (2010) (amending § 1848(m) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395w-4(m)) 
(requiring Secretary of HHS to integrate quality measures with meaningful use reporting requirements for 
physicians participating in the Physician Quality Reporting Initiative);  § 3015, 124 Stat. 119, 387 (2010) (amending 
Title III of the Public Services Act (42 U.S.C. 241)) (requiring Secretary of HHS to align data collection and 
aggregation efforts with standards for the interoperability of HIT systems). 
GW SPHHS   
Department of Health Policy 
19
 
 the descriptions below are intended to surface these complexities, but do not necessarily offer 
guidance or point to a set of solutions. 
 
Technical Considerations 
The ability to segment information within an EHR and, more broadly, in the context of electronic 
exchange, largely depends (from a technical feasibility standpoint) on a number of factors, 
including the ability to capture information in structured data fields, the application of common 
data definitions and terminologies so that such information can be interpreted correctly by others, 
and the use of common standards for sharing the information. 
 
Legacy Systems 
One major issue that hampers segmentation efforts is the persistence of “legacy” data systems 
that generally fail to meet the requirements enumerated above.127  Early EHR systems generally 
were designed to bring large amounts of data into a system without a focus on getting data out of 
the system.128  Further, many systems were developed simply to translate information that was 
recorded in paper format into electronic format.  The systems were not designed with 
segmentation in mind, and typically contain unstructured data that are not computable.  Also, 
most legacy systems are highly customized to meet the specific needs of an organization and 
require individualized mapping schemes in order to translate data from their particular system to 
a standardized structure and code.129  In addition, these systems typically represent significant 
investment on the part of provider organizations and would be very expensive (both in terms of 
direct and indirect costs) to replace or retrofit.130  Unfortunately, legacy systems also tend to be 
based on older software and hardware technologies that cannot match more efficient methods of 
performing certain tasks, may include procedures or terminologies that are no longer relevant in 
the current environment, and can hinder or compromise the capacity to achieve certain desired 
outcomes.131 
 
Most newer EHRs on the market today have the capacity to capture data in a structured fashion 
so that it resides in fixed, computable fields and corresponds to a coding mechanism that 
identifies the data element, its characteristics, and location within the system.  This means, for 
example, that during a clinical encounter a provider might record a diagnosis by selecting from a 
list in a drop-down menu that is specifically designated to record diagnoses.  The provider’s 
choice in turn corresponds to a standard coding schema that can be identified and appropriately 
interpreted (in some cases) by another system.  In many legacy systems, however, one of two 
situations typically exists: (1) the provider is relegated to typing the name of the diagnosis into a 
free-text field that is designed to capture any miscellaneous information recorded during a 
clinical encounter (resulting in non-structured data); or (2) a menu of options exists but is “home 
                                                 
127 Phone call with Gregory Caulton, Principal, PatientOS, February 2, 2010. 
128 Phone call with Dr. Ben Adida, supra note 75. 
129 Phone call with Ioana Singureanu, Eversolve, L.L.C., March 10, 2010. 
130 Id. 
131 Zandieh, S.O. et al. “Challenges to EHR Implementation in Electronic Versus Paper-Based Office Practices,” 
Journal of General Internal Medicine, Vol.  23, No. 6, March 28, 2008, 755-61; Congdon, K. “How Much Will and 
EHR System Cost You?” Healthcare Technology Online, September 14, 2009. Available at: 
http://www.healthcaretechnologyonline.com/article.mvc/How-Much-Will-An-EHR-System-Cost-You-0001. 
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 grown” and does not relate to a broader coding terminology that would be recognized or 
interpretable by other systems.132 
 
Few vendors have attempted to structure the fields within EHRs in a way that is compatible with 
other systems, in part because, historically, compatibility was not what their customers needed.  
Products created by the same vendor, but for different customers, may be highly customized and 
even use different standards, making the exchange of segmented records difficult.133  In fact, it is 
not uncommon for large vendor companies with multiple deployed products to sell their products 
as developer’s kits, which are then customized by individual institutions in a way that is not 
necessarily interoperable.134  Finally, many experts have emphasized the problems created by 
vendor lock-in, which has restricted organizations in their ability to exchange information with 
those external to their system.  However, as organizations move to more modular solutions, such 
as those advocated by some open source developers, vendor lock-in and the related challenges 
could be alleviated.135   
 
Data Entry 
Provision of optimal EHR technologies alone, however, will not result in the availability of 
structured data.  Even if the provider is not directly involved in deciding what information should 
be segmented, the act of recording data in a way that supports segmentation typically requires 
some alteration of the “usual” clinical workflow.  Providers are accustomed to recording 
information about patient encounters, whether in paper or electronic form, in whatever manner 
best reflects their style of practice.  Also, many clinicians skip or choose the default option on 
data fields and overly rely on the entry of free text, perhaps due to the perceived lack of 
flexibility and functionality of current EHR products.136  This is problematic for segmentation in 
at least two respects: 1) it represents an opportunity cost for recording higher quality data in 
structured fields that can later be pulled and analyzed for operations, quality improvement, and 
other research purposes; and 2) it makes the task of identifying and sequestering potentially 
sensitive information much more challenging.   
 
On one hand, if information in free text were to reference a condition or medication deemed by 
the patient as being too sensitive to share, for example, then – in order to protect the information 
– the entirety of that field would need to be withheld from exchange. 137  Moreover, for any 
given patient over time, the same type of information could be recorded in multiple fields and 
labeled as both sensitive and non-sensitive data within the record.  On the other hand, provide
who choose to use free text but desire to keep sensitive information out of the electronic record 
might obscure references to such information and / or even refer to sensitive health issues in 
cryptic notations known only to that clinician.  For example, in a study of behavioral health 
rs 
                                                 
132 Phone call with Ioana Singureanu, supra note 129; Maher, T. and L. Bloemer. “EHR Conversion Lessons,” Hayes 
Review, December 2009. Available at: 
http://www.hayesmanagement.com/media/newsletters/2009_December_article4.php. 
133 Phone call with Ioana Singureanu, supra note 129. 
134 Phone call with Dr. David Winn, Founder and Chairman, e-MDs, April 26, 2010. 
135 Phone call with Clint Crowe, CEO, HealthForge, April 20, 2010. 
136 Health IT Policy Committee, Privacy and Security Tiger Team, supra note 57, at 112. 
137 Phone call with Gregory Caulton, supra note 127. 
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 providers using EHRs, the clinicians referred to sensitive information included in free text in 
generic terms, such as referring to aspects of incest trauma as “inappropriat 138e contact.”  
                                                
 
Locating Data in the System 
When deconstructing a record for the purpose of segmentation, information that may need to be 
redacted is often intermingled, and therefore difficult to extract.139  Of particular concern is the 
fact that data points related to a particular health issue may be scattered in many parts of the 
record, including both free text and structured fields.140  Data in an EHR that indicates HIV 
status, for example, could be found in numerous fields, including white blood cell count results 
in a lab field; an antiretroviral prescription in the medication field; the presence of other related 
diagnoses (e.g., Kaposi’s sarcoma) in a problem list; and / or the reference to an HIV support 
group referral within the free text.  As a result,  the task of identifying every area of the EHR 
where sensitive information may appear has been perceived as daunting—free text portions of an 
EHR in particular, given that natural language processing technologies are widely viewed as 
being insufficiently developed to identify all references to information that might be considered 
sensitive.141  For this reason, many vendors, providers and other data stewards have expressed 
reservations about their ability to comply with such segmentation requests.  Conversely, if a 
strategy of casting a wider net is employed in order to ensure that every mention of the sensitive 
issue is captured, the result is likely to be a record with significant and potentially undesired gaps 
in information.142 
 
For this reason, some organizations have chosen to segment certain categories within specific 
data types (e.g., all mental health-related medications).  Similarly, as discussed earlier, 
organizations such as CORHIO have considered it simpler to exclude records altogether that are 
sourced from mental health clinics rather than try to filter out references to mental health issues 
within individuals’ data.  In CORHIO’s case, developers considered it particularly impractical to 
attempt to identify all data points related to mental health in a primary care record.143   
 
Terminology & Codes 
Because structured data content can be categorized and organized, it is a critical cornerstone for 
data segmentation.  However, recording of information in a structured fashion is not sufficient—
consistent interpretation of that information is also needed, particularly consistent interpretation 
of the discrete pieces of information that are being accessed or exchanged.  Such consistency 
requires the use of standard terminology and codes so that systems receiving the information can 
interpret it accurately and identify it appropriately as potentially requiring an action related to 
segmentation (e.g., the designation of “sensitive”).  In essence, exchange of information in a way 
that respects the consent preferences of the individual patient requires that all parties have the 
capacity to interpret the information included in a data field, and then apply some set of rules – 
 
138 Salomon, R.M. et al. “Openness of Patients’ Reporting with Use of Electronic Records: Psychiatric Clinicians’ 
Views.” Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, Vol. 17, 2010, pp. 54-60. 
139 Phone call with Carl Dvorak, Executive Vice President, Epic Systems, May 12, 2010. 
140 Phone call with Dr. Jamie Ferguson, Executive Director of Health Information Technology Strategy and Policy, 
May 24, 2010. 
141 Phone call with Gregory Caulton, supra note 127. 
142 Phone call with Dr. John Mattison, Chief Medical Information Officer, Kaiser Permanente, May 24, 2010. 
143 Phone call with Carrie Book, supra note 20. 
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 consistently – to that information.  That is, from a technology perspective, agreement on both 
structure and language is critical. 
 
Currently, there is no single standard code set used in EHRs, which complicates segmentation for 
developers, who must use toolsets and solutions that enable work in different standards.  Some 
have described the current situation as similar to using multiple-gauge railroad tracks within a 
single rail system and have expressed a desire for policy makers to choose one particular 
gauge.144  Other solutions that have been discussed include: 1) providing incentives to and / or 
requiring providers to begin recording and reporting select information according to a more 
constrained set of standards, and 2) encouraging the broader use of mapping technologies that 
could translate code sets so that information can be shared and correctly interpreted across 
systems.145   
 
An example of the latter method has been evidenced in the Kaiser Permanente environment.  In 
June 2009, Kaiser took part in a community-based electronic exchange project to translate data 
for exchange purposes between different systems.146  The demonstration involved two 
organizations that use different data standards (both of which are sufficiently structured) 
exchanging information with NHIN software.147  In addition, as described later in this paper, 
Kaiser established a partnership in January 2010 with the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) 
to share medical records as part of a pilot in San Diego, CA.  The project allows patients who 
visit both Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Hospitals and Kaiser clinics to benefit from 
electronic exchange.148  Kaiser has a different software system from the VA, but can share 
records with the agency using the same technology as used in the NHIN exchange project. 
 
Building Intelligence 
Databases are dumb149—the data contained therein must be “told” what to do in support of the 
user’s specific objectives.  In order to instruct systems on how to apply the segmentation 
preference / requirements of an individual, an organization, or a state, an accompanying set of 
directions – often referred to as “rules engines” – must be developed.  Rules engines are software 
systems that execute a set of orders and can be used to customize data output responses to 
particular situations.150  For example, an adult with a blood disorder may request that her 
providers withhold information related to the condition, except in the event of an emergency 
hospitalization.  If she were to be admitted to an emergency department, a rules engine could 
automatically release the usually-sequestered information so that it would be available to the 
treating clinicians. 
 
                                                 
144 Phone call with Dr. David Winn, supra note 134. 
145 Phone call with Ioana Singureanu, supra note 129. 
146 California e-Health Collaborative. Successful Demonstration of Health Information Exchange Opens ARRA 
Stimulus Options for California, June 26, 2009. Available at: 
http://www.californiaehealth.org/news/caehc_pressrelease_20090626.pdf. 
147 Id. 
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 Rules engines can be developed and applied to EHR data within a closed system, which allows 
for the establishment of rules and data protocols that conform to specific institutional policies 
(e.g., non-release of certain clinical information to specific staff).  They can also be built to 
support the collaboration of multiple organizations – say in the establishment of an HIO – so that 
a common set of rules for information management can be applied consistently across 
participants.  Many examples of both models exist, and are described further in the next section.   
 
Conveying Information Sharing Across Multiple Systems 
As referenced above, far less common in practice is the capacity to provide an additional layer of 
intelligence that is sometimes referred to as a “database of consents.”  This type of application 
stores individual preferences for information management (e.g., withhold all references to 
congenital heart condition from all providers except for the cardiologist, OR require permission 
for all disclosures not directly related to the provision of care), and can then be referenced before 
any information sharing action is taken.  An important distinction between a rules engine that 
supports the information management of a provider organization and a consent database is that 
the former is intended to reflect institutional policies with regard to information sharing, whereas 
the latter is intended to reflect an individual’s preferences for the sharing of his / her information. 
 
These consent systems can be deployed within a specific organizational structure, but likely will 
provide the highest level of utility to consumers when they can serve as the ultimate authority 
that sets the rules to which all organizations must adhere.  As discussed in more detail in the 
Consumer Engagement section below, this is not yet a viable option.   
 
In the interim, another option that may prove to be more technically feasible in the near term 
(and also more aligned with current information sharing practices) is that of creating flagging / 
tagging standards that can convey the presence or absence of potentially sensitive information 
within a summary record (as discussed in more detail below).  Specifically, the Continuity of 
Care Record (CCR) and the Continuity of Care Document (CCD)151 are designed as ways of 
passing information between entities, and their use is being encouraged as a means of 
exchanging at least a core set of clinical information between providers to support care 
coordination.  At present, however, standards do not exist to support the transmission of these 
summary documents in a way that retains flags alerting the recipient to the presence of 
potentially sensitive information that is to be afforded special treatment.  The information can be 
sent, but the notation is lost.   
 
Defining Sensitivity 
As referenced earlier in this paper, many policy discussions regarding data segmentation (in 
particular those convened by NCVHS) have focused on the issue of whether and, if so, how to 
define what types of data (if any) should be afforded special treatment.  That is, should consumer 
preferences regarding information sharing be supported through the determination and strict 
application of definitions for what constitutes “sensitive” information, or should policies that 
                                                 
151 The CCR and CCD are two clinical records standards used to aggregate and export clinical data.  They are both 
designed to collect a core set of data in a standard format and enable it to be exchanged.  Any organization exporting 
these documents must follow strict rules and standards in order for the documents to be interpreted correctly by the 
recipient. See Kahn, S. and V. Sheshadri. “Medical Record Privacy and Security in a Digital Environment,” IT 
Professional, March/April 2008, pp. 46-52, at 48-49. 
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 allow for greater subjectivity and individual autonomy be considered?  Implicit in this discussion 
are the related questions of whether sensitive health information should be treated differently 
from other kinds of health information and, if so, who should decide what information falls into 
that category?  Finally, should those decisions be based on societal norms or individual 
preferences?   
 
In general, institutional stewards of patient information tend to rely primarily on federal and state 
definitions (often based on legal requirements) that categorize certain information as being 
sensitive.  In order to comply with such definitions, and sometimes to enable some control on the 
part of the patient, most organizations that permit segmentation have done so by pre-defining a 
set of rules for applying restrictions on data sharing.  Among other approaches, they have: 
 
 Identified particular key words (or fields in an EHR) that should be treated as sensitive; 
 Identified clinical categories that should be treated as sensitive; 
 Differentiated information based on its type (e.g. medications, labs); and / or 
 Differentiated information based on its source (e.g. all information from federally-
assisted substance abuse facilities) 
 
These approaches, while challenging in some ways, have allowed organizations to establish and 
operationalize standard policies without applying undue burden on providers, IT professionals, 
and others who might be challenged by the need to accommodate more individualized requests. 
 
Many consumers, however, believe that one-size-fits-all determinations of this nature, absent 
input from individuals, are misguided.  Some, believing that such determinations are purely 
subjective, have asserted that it would be impossible to specify a priori the set of information or 
data types that different individuals may want to sequester.  According to a recent Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) publication on consumer engagement, based on focus 
group research, “there was near universal agreement in all the groups that, if medical data are to 
be stored electronically, health care consumers should have some say in how those data are 
shared and used.”152  The report further indicates a lack of support for the establishment of 
general rules that would apply to all health care consumers; it was thought that people should be 
able to exert some control individually.  Applied to the issue of defining sensitivity, these results 
indicate support for a more subjective approach whereby patients are afforded the opportunity to 
define in their own terms what information they consider to be too sensitive to expose, and what 
information they would share with others.  As described in more detail later in this paper, the 
Massachusetts eHealth Collaborative (MAeHC), for example, spent a considerable amount of 
time engaging the community in defining what information would be considered sensitive and 
determining patient preferences.  They also worked with provider organizations and incorporated 
provider perspectives when creating their processes and procedures.153 
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 In acknowledgment of this perspective, experts often stress the need to engage the patient in the 
process of data segmentation.154  Indeed, policies and practices that encourage patient 
participation in establishing information management and use preferences, either on their own or 
with assistance from a provider or other professional acting on their behalf, may result in greater 
patient satisfaction.  Given that individuals may make different information management 
decisions at different points in their lives or under different health conditions, the importance of 
revisiting these preferences periodically has also been stressed.155 
 
So what are the hurdles to accommodating the desire for a more individualized approach?  Part 
of the answer lies in the response to a related question.  That is, how should the needs of 
individual patients be considered relative to those of various other stakeholders who may desire 
access to the information in question and / or prefer not to confront the practical and logistical 
implications of distinguishing it from other non-sensitive information.   
 
Even if a particular segmentation approach is technically feasible and desirable from a policy 
point of view, it may be impractical or difficult to achieve logistically.  The ability to segment 
sensitive data appropriately and effectively, in addition to complying with established criteria in 
the electronic exchange process, requires the consideration of a variety of interests, the careful 
management of large amounts of “scattered”156 data, and the coordination of rules across 
disparate policy and technology environments.   
 
Stakeholders often mention these and other considerations when articulating a preference for the 
establishment of some baseline policies and information management protocols to support the 
segmentation of specific sensitive information.  Many technology vendors, for example, have 
expressed a preference for the specification and definition of what constitutes sensitive 
information so that they can develop one solution that meets the needs of multiple clients.157  For 
example, vendors have noted that, when diverse state laws result in the need to apply different 
rules regarding sensitive information in different locations, it is challenging to create and support 
such applications.158  In addition, some exchange organizations have also suggested that 
consistent laws and policies regarding sensitive information would facilitate the appropriate 
sharing of information.159 
 
In any event, if policy makers do find it necessary and desirable to establish a standard definition 
of what constitutes sensitive information, the questions remain of who and at what level such 
determinations should be made.  Various possibilities include individual providers, HIOs, and 
states, although some advocate that, given the magnitude of the practical and technical 
challenges involved, the task should be undertaken by the federal government.  Regardless of the 
particular author of such a definition, numerous stakeholders will struggle with its application as 
well its enforcement. 
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 Consumer Engagement 
Exercising individual preferences for information sharing (i.e., making segmentation decisions) 
presumes a level of understanding about what is possible, what is desirable, and what the 
potential consequences of those decisions may be.  Packed into this process are some very real 
concerns about the capacity of individuals to appreciate these nuances and act accordingly, as 
well as more logistical concerns about how individuals could reasonably be expected to 
articulate their preferences in a manner that could be honored by multiple, diverse data holders in 
the health care environment.  The section below approaches the consumer engagement 
discussion in three basic parts: 1) What are the issues related to capacity (can they do it)? 2) 
What are the concerns related to motivation (do they want to do it)? and 3) What are the 
concerns related to logistics (how can they reasonably do it)? 
 
Capacity 
It is widely recognized that the U.S. health care system does a fairly poor job of engaging 
patients and their families in decisions about and processes of care.  As noted in a recent Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation brief, patients say they are bewildered by the system’s complexity, 
intimidated by its medical and legal jargon, and usually unable to obtain meaningful information 
about quality or cost.160  One key capacity challenge is that of engaging people in a potentially 
overwhelming process that often requires making choices absent full information, clinical 
context, appreciation of consequences, or adequate provider support.  Many health policy experts 
expect or at least hope that, when equipped with more and better information to support decision 
making, consumers will become more active participants in and self-managers of their own 
health and health care.  A central question then becomes whether it is possible to provide 
consumers with sufficient and appropriate information such that they can make decisions not 
only about their health and health care, but also about the ways in which they want their health 
information to be segmented for use according to their values, beliefs and preferences in support 
of those decisions?  To address this question, we briefly explore below the concepts of decision 
significance and frequency, both of which may have implications for a person’s capacity and 
desire to express granular preferences for information sharing. 
 
As individuals in a free society, we are accustomed to making thousands of decisions each day—
many of little significance or consequence, and others of much greater import.  For the former 
type, it is unlikely that a lack of complete information or contextual understanding will have 
serious implications or be of much consequence to the individual.  For more complex decisions, 
however, such as whether a patient should share or withhold from other parties his / her full 
mental health history, the concept of “bounded rationality” (the notion that, in decision making, 
rationality of individuals is limited by the information they have, the cognitive limitations of 
their minds, and the finite amount of time they have) becomes more relevant.161  Certainly, lay 
persons typically are at an information disadvantage relative to medical professionals responsible 
for their care, and are much less well acquainted with the way data flows through the health care 
system.162  In addition, the health information in question is not always provided or discussed in 
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 a meaningful context or well understood by the patient, which raises additional concerns about 
health literacy.  Further, we know that most patients have little sense of how their information is 
shared (or not), and what provisions exist to protect it (or not) outside the boundaries of their 
doctor’s computer or file cabinet.163 
 
Related to the complexity issue is the issue of volume, or decision overload.  Studies have shown 
that, while people may prefer to choose from as many alternatives as possible, decision-making 
ability is compromised when too many choices are offered.164  A related body of research 
suggests that the process of making too many “minor” decisions can hamper people’s ability to 
focus on decisions of greater significance.165  Researchers have hypothesized that when people 
are faced with “too much choice,” they feel burdened by the responsibility of choosing between 
good and bad decisions and are less able psychologically to distinguish between the choices.166  
It has also been hypothesized that the “too much choice” effect would be more pronounced in 
choices such as medical treatment decisions, since these decisions involve greater costs 
associated with making a “wrong” choice and take substantial time and effort to make an 
informed comparison.167 
 
If patients are able to navigate successfully a series of complex information management 
decisions, the “portability” of those decisions remains a challenge in the context of electronic 
exchange.  As discussed in more detail below, patients have no way of expressing their 
information management preferences all at once (e.g., through a single entity or portal) in such a 
manner that ensures accommodation (i.e., adherence) by all data holders and seekers.  As such, 
patients can be asked to articulate their preferences numerous times, in a variety of different 
ways.  Assuming this is the case, implementing fine-grained controls for data segmentation on 
numerous occasions may result in patients forgetting which of the many options have been 
selected.168  For example, patients may forget which information they shared with each provider 
and, subsequently, which information they want blocked from all providers.  This constant flux is 
likely to hamper the patient’s ability to make strategic decisions regarding his / her health care.   
 
These findings related to consumer decision-making capacity have implications for policy 
makers and others desiring to identify optimal approaches for engaging patients in decisions 
about how, under what circumstances, and with whom their health information can be shared.  
Considering the numerous challenges and complexities referenced above, some would propose to 
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 eliminate or minimize patient engagement in segmentation decisions, thereby deeming individual 
consumers incapable of making such complex decisions and preferring instead to leave such 
matters to policy makers at the organizational, state, and / or national level.  Others might 
constrain consumer segmentation preferences, and therefore choices, and / or establish a set of 
discrete and uniform options (and then focus consumer education efforts on those few key 
points).  For example, patients might be afforded the right to segment based on the purpose of 
information exchange (e.g., marketing), but have no ability to constrain access to their 
information for disclosures permitted by the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 
 
Others might take an entirely different approach that involves the use of innovative technologies 
and communications tactics to support consumers in the processing of such complex decisions.  
For example, Private Access, an early-stage company developing privacy enhancing technologies 
for the transfer of medical information, is developing a unique graphical interface to assist users 
in the decision making process.  The company has engineered trusted guides that enable users to 
identify their privacy preferences concerning the visibility and transfer of medical data.  By 
answering questions in the guides, users are able to gauge the levels of security that are typically 
needed to accommodate their preferences and subsequently adopt these settings in the Private 
Access platform.169 
 
An alternative model is presented in Indivo X, a PCHR system that enables individuals to “own” 
and manage health and wellness information.  The Indivo X platform facilitates substitutability 
within the medical record landscape (that is, it serves as the central hub for information and can 
be updated to reflect the most recent, and therefore most accurate, data) and allows users to 
communicate with third parties.170  Its centrally-located consumer preference hub allows for both 
a seamless transfer of medical data (limited at this point to exchange within a single provider 
organization) and also limits the need for patients to reiterate privacy decisions at each point of 
entry into the health care system.  In essence, neither Private Access nor Indivo X limits choice a 
priori, but instead provides some level of assistance or guidance that is meant simultaneously to 
educate patients about issues relevant to segmentation and guide them through the process of 
executing those choices.  Both systems are discussed in more detail later in this paper. 
  
Motivation 
Surveys have indicated that the public wants a wide range of choices with respect to how their 
information is shared, with whom, and for what purposes.171  In a perfect choice environment, 
patients would have the time, interest, and incentives to learn about and consider a variety of 
factors relevant to their decisions.  As medical information is shared in a less-than-perfect 
environment, however, there are varying levels of patient involvement and interest in 
information management.  Studies have indicated that, while the majority of consumers would 
like to participate actively in the medical decision making process, others are less concerned.172  
                                                 
169 Shelton, R.H. Written Testimony Before the HIT Policy Committee Privacy and Security Tiger Team, June 29, 
2010. Available at: 
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 There are a multitude of factors that determine a patient’s desire for involvement in decision 
making, including the desire for receiving information (the process of information evaluation) 
and the desire to take responsibility for the treatment decision itself.173  It seems likely that the 
same varying degrees of participation exist in the realm of health information sharing, as studies 
show that some patients would like to leverage EHRs to help them customize their care 
experience and information sharing, while others are less concerned with the privacy of health 
information and willing to forgo providing input into how their information flows.174 
 
Logistics 
In addition to consumer capacity and motivation issues, one of the more obvious deterrents to 
direct patient articulation of their information sharing preferences is that no single vehicle exists 
for capturing and then propagating such preferences across multiple provider settings or other  
exchange entities.  For example, a patient in a multi-hospital system may be able to (within the 
parameters established by the organization) create a directive, but the patient’s preferences 
cannot be recorded automatically so as to be accommodated by a provider outside the system (or 
potentially even by individual hospitals within the same system). 
 
While a harmonizing entity or universal consent directive that can interpret and operationalize 
patient preferences and resolve discrepancies across entities may one day be developed, a current 
impediment to data segmentation is patients’ potential unwillingness to go through the same (or a 
similar) process multiple times.  Ultimately, to the extent that the segmentation policies and 
protocols of various provider entities converge, this issue may be simplified.  In the current 
environment, however, and assuming a high level of granularity, the process of establishing 
multiple consent directives likely would be too onerous for most patients even if it were well 
supported by the provider community. 
 
In absence of the aforementioned “harmonizing entity,” several technologies exist to allow 
patients to articulate information sharing preferences within a single network.  For example, 
Microsoft HealthVault is a PHR that allows users to filter out parts of their record when sharing 
information directly with individual providers or other users within the community.  However, 
when a user wants to allow a third-party “network,” such as a hospital, to view and contribute to 
his / her PHR, the user must grant the network access to pre-determined parts of the record.175  
Alternatively, Google Health provides personal health information centralization services that 
allow users to load their health records into the Google system, ultimately creating one profile of 
health information from multiple providers.  Similar to HealthVault, however, Google Health 
does not have the ability to communicate or enforce the execution of patient preferences with 
outside entities.176   
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 Provider Reluctance 
 
Quality and Safety Concerns 
Other challenges associated with the segmentation of health information in the context of 
electronic exchange fall within the category of provider reluctance.  Chief among these is the 
concern that the non-inclusion or withholding of certain health information (whether it be 
deemed by the individual patient as significant or not) can compromise patient safety and inhibit 
the provision of high quality care.  Many providers involved in the establishment of and / or 
participating in exchanges have expressed the concern that classifying any amount of 
information as sensitive, and thus allowing patients to sequester certain portions of their records, 
may create safety and quality of care issues.  The basic issue is how patient preferences for (non) 
disclosure should be balanced with provider preferences for access to the complete clinical 
record.   
 
Many experts believe that patients are ill-equipped to determine which pieces of information 
might be clinically relevant to a particular provider or in a specific clinical context, and therefore 
should not have the ability to (potentially) compromise their own safety by restricting access to 
their information.  This sentiment is a particularly common refrain in discussions of medication 
safety and is ultimately the reason why so many electronic exchange initiatives offer a “break the 
glass” provision, or a way for a provider to access patient information that has been sequestered.  
On the other side of the discussion, many patient and consumer advocates counter that 
individuals should be afforded a choice, and that such decisions could ultimately be facilitated by 
enhanced patient / provider communication and the provision of more and better information. 
 
Kaiser Permanente’s Mid-Atlantic regional exchange provides an example of the complexity of 
these policy decisions and the interplay of legal considerations and the desirability of enabling 
segmentation given such safety concerns.  Largely due to minor consent laws, policy makers at 
Kaiser chose to limit the information contained in its integrated EHR / PHR system177 for 
individuals between the ages of 13 and 18 to just a few categories, including allergies, 
immunizations and the content of secure messages exchanged with clinicians.178  Although 
parents are not given access to the minors’ records in such instances, a key concern was the 
possibility that parents could coerce the minor into providing them with access—thereby 
necessitating some level of segmentation.179  Kaiser therefore determined a priori a specified list 
of procedures that it would treat as sensitive and not available to either the minor or parent.  
Despite this policy determination, and out of a concern for safety, Kaiser Mid-Atlantic opted to 
include information related to medications and allergies in the exchange which, they 
acknowledged, could (in some circumstances) reveal information that they had defined as 
sensitive.180 
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 Another factor often considered in this debate is whether an institution’s segmentation policy 
could effectively mitigate safety concerns related to the availability of complete information on 
which to base clinical decisions.  To address providers’ concerns regarding incomplete 
information, it has been suggested that records from which certain information has been redacted 
should be flagged or tagged in order to increase providers’ trust in the contents.  The inclusion of 
some notation that information is missing would alert a provider that caution and special care 
may be warranted, and that additional dialogue with the patient (if possible) likely is necessary.  
However, some advocates have cautioned that the use of flags alone could undermine the critical 
trust element that exists in the patient-provider relationship.181 
 
At least two approaches for such notation have been applied, each with merits and drawbacks.  
One solution involves provision of a general notice that information has been sequestered, but 
one that does not identify the specific category of data.  Because it is more opaque and less likely 
to reveal the sensitive information, this approach might be preferred by patients.  A disadvantage 
of this approach from the provider perspective, however, is that it may require further time and 
effort to discover the information deemed necessary for the provision of safe care.    
  
Another approach, and one more commonly preferred by care providers, requires that the 
segmented category of data be noted specifically (e.g., mental health information exists but has 
been sequestered from the record).  While it permits the provider to make a more informed 
judgment as to whether the category is likely to be relevant to the current encounter, it may, in 
some cases, expose the sensitive information.  A permutation of this approach is the scenario in 
which only the source of the segmented information is noted, not the data itself.  This approach 
too may reveal more than desired by the patient.  For example, a notation that information from 
the Betty Ford Clinic has been sequestered constitutes a pretty strong clue that the individual has 
been treated for substance abuse.    
 
Implicit in the flagging discussion is the issue of whether an EHR is viewed more as the 
definitive source for clinicians to gain access to patient clinical information and therefore should 
be complete (i.e., enable little or no segmentation), or whether it represents a set of information 
that is to be expanded and enhanced through further patient-provider communication.  Of course, 
the two ideas are not mutually exclusive, but there tend to be strong views on either end of the 
continuum: those preferring absolute unfettered access as opposed to those willing to cede some 
control while hoping to make up for information gaps through enhanced patient engagement. 
 
As an example, some exchanges effectively have established an expectation that the EHR should 
not be viewed as the definitive source of information, and should therefore be augmented with 
information generated through patient and provider communications.  Such groups explain that 
setting this provider expectation, regardless of whether patient data are missing as a result of 
segmentation, leads to enhanced patient engagement.  When establishing policies regarding 
segmentation within the MAeHC, for example, the developers encountered concerns from 
clinicians who were skeptical about the utility of a potentially incomplete record.182  In response, 
the MAeHC leadership emphasized the need for clinicians within the exchange to speak with 
patients and obtain as much information as necessary through those conversations and other 
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 channels in order to provide appropriate care.183  Depending on the predominant view of the 
purpose of the EHR in a given exchange environment, the implications of segmentation for the 
participating entities will likely vary. 
 
Quality of care is another factor commonly cited in the discussion of whether and to what extent 
data segmentation should be accommodated.  Specifically, providers often suggest that, absent 
relevant and potentially important clinical information (e.g., a complete list of medications), they 
will be unable to guarantee the provision of quality care, including the determination of how best 
to communicate clinical information to patients.  As a key element of quality, care coordination 
also may be inhibited by a lack of information sharing.  For example, a study of small medical 
practices found that a lack of interoperability between EHRs when exchanging information 
between practices resulted in incomplete information related to medications and a lack of access 
to test results, hampering effective care coordination.184  This factor becomes particularly 
apparent in situations of care transition, where coordination of information and communication 
across providers can have significant implications for care quality and patient outcomes.185 
 
Workflow Implications 
Providers also have expressed concern about the workflow implications of supporting even 
moderately granular segmentation.  In many emerging HIOs, and certainly within discrete 
provider entities, the default expectation is that clinicians play a role in guiding patients through 
the consent (and segmentation, if supported) processes.  This expectation reflects the fact that 
most patients prefer to receive information and guidance directly from their health care providers 
(as opposed to other parties in the health care system (e.g., insurers)).  Despite this preference, 
providers typically do not have sufficient time in their patient encounters to spend on non-
clinical matters, and might view those related to information management as such.186   
 
Additionally, many clinicians may not view such interactions as a requisite or desired part of 
their role as a provider, which is often linked to concerns about the specific interface used for 
establishing segmentation preferences.187  Some providers are reluctant to spend time interacting 
with EHRs in the presence of patients because of the perception that it disrupts the encounter,188 
and studies have shown that some providers believe the typical process for documentation in 
EHRs distracts them from their interactions with patients.189  Similarly, some providers believe 
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 EHRs are designed to communicate with insurers and are not good tools for facilitating 
communications across providers.190  Further, some providers do not want to take what is 
perceived as an expanded role as the reliability of such systems is not well understood, and the 
sustainability of specific products has not been well documented.191  Without solid evidence, 
providers may not want to take an active role in pioneering technology that may have quirks and 
need refinement.192   
 
Technology considerations aside, providers may not have the information, tools, expertise or 
desire necessary to help patients navigate a series of decisions related to information 
management.  One particular issue is whether providers, as agents acting on behalf of their 
patients, could reasonably be expected to record privacy preferences in a consistent fashion and 
in appropriate health record fields.  Absent such consistency, providers documenting a patient’s 
privacy preferences could categorize information differently, allowing references to sensitive 
information to remain in the general record.193   
 
In efforts to avoid the aforementioned concerns, some systems have developed approaches to aid 
patients in making decisions regarding privacy preferences without depending on the sole 
guidance of providers.  The VA, for example, implemented the use of privacy advocates and / or 
security administrators to aid patients in creating appropriate privacy constraints for sensitive 
information.194  Such personnel take the direct responsibility away from the provider, and 
ensures that patient questions and concerns are addressed in order to better satisfy privacy 
preferences.   
 
Ability to Accommodate Patient Expectations 
Many providers (in addition to technology vendors and others) have expressed significant 
reservations about the ability of their information systems and internal data management 
processes to accommodate individual segmentation preferences reliably, accurately and 
completely.  One factor referred to above is that, in recording clinical observations and notes as 
part of a clinical encounter, providers do not always enter data in the intended or usual fields.  
The concern here is that patients might express a desire to segment from view “all of the data 
related to their history of depression,” but likely would not appreciate how challenging that task 
may be.  To achieve complete success in this example would require the identification of every 
data point in the record that is related to the information considered sensitive—in this case, a 
history of depression.  On the same note, patients might also be unsympathetic to any failures of 
a provider’s system to accommodate their requests.   
 
Rather than risking the possibility of failing to catch every instance of a data element deemed by 
the patient as sensitive, many provider organizations and HIOs have expressed reluctance to 
assume this responsibility.  As such, few entities offer much granular patient choice in the area of 
information management.  Some organizations allow for segmentation based on provider type or 
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 name, but very few are willing to hold themselves accountable for ensuring that the more 
granular preferences of patients are enabled.  In general, either segmentation preferences of this 
nature are not allowed, or certain types of data (those related to sensitive conditions) are 
excluded altogether from exchange. 
 
Liability Concerns 
In addition to the accountability issue, and related also to the safety and care quality points 
discussed above, providers also have expressed concern about the extent to which they may be 
held responsible or liable for a patient’s experience in situations where, despite access to an 
EHR, the provider did not have all of the information at his / her disposal that would be clinically 
relevant for that patient’s situation.195  As EHRs are viewed increasingly as a tool to help 
alleviate important information gaps (such as providing a complete medication list), providers 
have little interest in minimizing their utility by enabling segmentation.  Their concern lies in the 
idea that, if the standard of practice in the future is for providers to consult their information 
systems (e.g., EHRs) to support clinical decision making, then they do not want to be held 
responsible for actions taken based on imperfect information.  However, to date efforts to 
evaluate the impact of electronic exchange of health information on providers’ medical 
malpractice liability have not found sufficient legal basis on which to make conclusions.196 
 
Finally, concerns regarding interpretation of and compliance with legal requirements may also 
create reluctance to pursue electronic exchange.  For example, developers of the Clinical 
Management for Behavioral Health Services (CMBHS) system, which enables the electronic 
exchange of behavioral health records within the state of Texas, have cited interpretation of laws 
regarding consent as a challenge to their faster pursuit of greater interoperability.197 
 
Legal Considerations 
As outlined earlier, a complex network of state and federal laws has been developed to protect 
the privacy of personal health information.  Where specific information within an individual’s 
health record falls within the purview of these laws, data segmentation could serve as a useful 
tool in facilitating compliance that still allows for meaningful electronic exchange.  However, the 
wide variety in these laws can pose challenges for entities whose goal is to exchange health 
information on a regional, or even national, basis.198  Examples of such laws are addressed 
below.   
 
HITECH out-of-pocket provision 
The HITECH provision requiring that providers honor a patient’s request to restrict disclosure of 
PHI related to treatment or services for which the patient has paid out-of-pocket in full presents a 
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 challenge to providers and, more broadly, electronic exchange that advances in data 
segmentation could help alleviate.  The provision places such requirements on the provider only 
where the purpose of the disclosure is for payment or health care operations purposes and is not 
otherwise required by law—disclosures made for treatment purposes are allowed regardless of a 
patient’s payment method.199  The provision therefore seems to require that a system separate 
information on the basis of both purpose of use and the identity of the recipient.  For example, 
some analysts have highlighted the tremendous segmentation challenge related to preventing 
insurance companies from accessing information related to procedures paid for out-of-pocket.200   
 
Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records (Part 2) 
Part 2 has been perceived as presenting challenges to the development of policies and practices 
for electronic exchange, particularly in the area of data segmentation.  As described above, the 
regulations strictly limit disclosure and use of information about individuals seeking or obtaining 
diagnosis, referral or treatment in federally assisted alcohol or drug abuse treatment programs.201  
Because Part 2 generally requires written patient consent for the disclosure of patient-identifying 
information that specifies, among other things, the purpose of the disclosure, who is to receive 
the information, and a date or condition upon which the consent expires, data systems that 
include such information would be required to develop a means of ensuring and documenting 
such consent, as well as the capability of segmenting the information in order to comply with the 
law.  These challenges might only be amplified in the case of treatment programs that fall under 
the umbrella of larger organizations with multiple departments that all generate data for the same 
patient.  As a result, it is possible that, despite the continuity of care, quality improvement, and 
public health benefits that could result from its inclusion, data covered by Part 2 will be excluded 
from some exchange operations altogether.    
 
Mental Health Information 
In a similar manner, laws that protect information specifically related to mental health treatment 
often prevent disclosure without consent, thus presenting challenges to electronic exchange that 
advances in data segmentation could help alleviate.  Developers themselves are particularly 
challenged by the prospect of segmenting mental health information that is scattered throughout 
the health record, for example in primary care records.202 
 
As noted previously, larger institutions may face particular difficulties with respect to 
maintaining the privacy of any information within a patient’s health record that could possibly 
fall within the purview of laws related to mental health treatment.  Due to legal concerns, for 
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 example, Vanderbilt Medical Center – a large treatment center where patients may receive care 
from many different departments – created an EHR system that strictly sequesters all information 
related to mental health treatment, including appointments, psychiatric notes and telephone 
communications, in a separate database accessible only by psychiatric providers.203  The 
Vanderbilt system prevents other providers, such as surgeons or internists, from viewing any 
information that could indicate that a patient is receiving psychiatric treatment at the 
institution.204  It is worth noting, however, that laboratory results, medications, diagnoses and 
problem lists are listed in the EHR and made available to all providers in the system.205 
 
Despite the perceived difficulties associated with the segmentation of information related to both 
Part 2 and mental health treatment, technology developers have been working on solutions to the 
various challenges.  For example, CMBHS created a technical solution specifically designed to 
accommodate state and federal regulations regarding medical records related to substance abuse 
treatment programs and behavioral health.  Although CMBHS is currently operating as a closed 
system, and thus is not exchanging records with outside providers, the system does enable 
compliance with the consent documentation requirements of Part 2 and other relevant laws.  
More specifically, CMBHS documents the consent preferences of patients, including allowing 
for an expiration of consent, and where consent has not been provided for the disclosure of 
particular information, such information will not be released.206 
 
Minors 
Segmentation policies and practices with respect to the health information of minors are also 
viewed as challenging, in part due to the multiple factors and perspectives that must be 
considered.  These include laws related to the rights of minors to consent to procedures, the 
rights of parents to access related records, the sometimes-conflicting needs and interests of both 
parents and minors, and factors related to the unique qualities of minors themselves, such as 
vulnerability to coercion or abuse.  For example, developers of electronic exchange efforts in 
New York determined that compliance with New York minor consent laws would require a 
system to tag all data related to a procedure to which a minor has consented, record the related 
minor consent status in a structured field, and then transmit minor consent status and information 
tags within the exchange.207  In the face of these complications, the New York Statewide 
Collaboration Process (SCP), in its recommendations for policies and procedures for HIOs in the 
State of New York, suggested excluding the exchange of health records of minors above a 
minimum age, but allowing the exchange of health records of younger children.208  The SCP has 
yet to recommend a minimum age, but concluded that the harm of blocking young children’s 
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 records from an exchange was considerable and outweighed the privacy concerns regarding the 
small number of minor consent procedures that would likely occur among children in that age 
range.209 
 
As mentioned earlier, Kaiser’s Mid-Atlantic region likewise has recognized the challenges of 
respecting a minor’s privacy rights and has chosen to limit the information included in the health 
records of 13 – 18 year olds to allergies and immunizations.210  By doing so, Kaiser hoped to 
avoid violating the varied and conflicting laws related to minor access that would apply in the 
Mid-Atlantic region.  These include, for example, a Washington, DC law that allows a minor of 
any age to consent to a limited amount of outpatient treatment for mental health and protects the 
related records, and a Maryland law that only allows minors age 16 and over to consent to 
behavioral health treatment, but gives the health care provider discretion regarding disclosing the 
related records to the parent.211 
 
Finally, Indivo’s solution for protecting a minor’s privacy in a way that complies with the many 
different Massachusetts state laws related to minor consent involves granting different levels of 
parental access to the record according to the minor’s age.212  Under Massachusetts law, a drug-
dependent minor age 12 and older may consent to substance abuse treatment, while a minor must 
be at least 16 in order to consent to outpatient mental health treatment.213  A minor of any age 
may consent to treatment for HIV or an STI.214  In the Indivo system, a parent is granted full 
access to the health record if the minor is under 13, while the parent of a minor between the ages 
of 13 and 18 is granted access to non-sensitive information in the record and the adolescent is 
granted control of all sensitive information.215 
 
EXAMPLES OF SYSTEMS ENGAGING IN DATA SEGMENTATION 
 
Data Segmentation in the Health Care Sector 
As discussed above, several core components, including the level at which information is 
segmented (i.e., capture, access, or view); the party that decides what information will be 
blocked; the person or entity that holds the authority and ability to apply segmentation 
preferences; the data that are eligible for exchange; and the part(ies) allowed access to the data 
for what purpose and what amount of time all affect the performance of data segmentation and, 
therefore, information sharing in general.  This section explores the concept of data segmentation 
by analyzing examples of approaches that have been developed within the health care sector.  
After an introductory discussion of general developments within the field, the section is 
organized first by categorizing the person or entity that holds the authority and ability to apply 
segmentation preferences, followed by a more detailed discussion of particular examples.  The 
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 featured systems are intended to reflect the various stages of development and diversity within 
the field, but are not exhaustive or fully representative of the data segmentation landscape.  In 
addition, most systems do not fall neatly within one particular category, as their methods and 
processes (and, indeed the categories themselves) are constantly evolving. 
 
As discussed at the recent Consumer Choice Technology Hearing sponsored by the Tiger 
Team,216 and later in the Tiger Team’s initial set of draft recommendations,217 the prevailing 
view is that technologies capable of enabling granular segmentation are promising in general but
still in the early stages of development.
 
 
llenge. 
                                                
218  For example, as the Tiger Team noted, many EHR 
systems can suppress narrative psychotherapy notes and some vendors offer the ability to 
suppress specific codes,219 but the communication of those rules or protocols across systems still
poses a cha
 
Commercial applications can also apply filtering to aggregate information pursuant to 
contractual or legal requirements, but most commercial EHR systems do not yet offer that 
capacity on an individual patient basis.  Some allow a user to set access controls according to 
episode of care / encounter / location of encounter, but may not include all of the information 
generated in a particular episode (e.g., prescription information).  Further, prevention of 
downstream clinical inferences remains a challenge—that is, it does not yet seem possible to 
prevent inferences that might be made from, for example, the inclusion of lab test results in a 
record that indicate a particular malady, even though the diagnosis notation itself has been 
blocked from view.  Finally, as the Tiger Team noted, the possibility of “tagging” or applying 
patient consent notations to data so that they follow the data as it is shared across entities has not 
been implemented successfully on a large-scale basis within health care or any other sector.220  
While there are currently several examples of EHRs that allow a practitioner to label data that 
should not be passed on without consent,221 this technology has been implemented only “locally” 
within a hospital, hospital network, provider network or physician group.  Although work is 
being done in the area, developers have not yet created a method to propagate segmentation 
preferences seamlessly across multiple institutions or systems electronically.222   
 
Patient-controlled segmentation 
As previously discussed, data segmentation policies have been captured in law and institutional 
governance at least in part to accommodate individual preferences with respect to health 
information sharing.  However, it is not common at this point for individuals to apply these 
preferences to their data directly.  Currently, the most dominant model is for patient preferences 
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219 Id. at 14. 
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 to be put in place by a provider (possibly via use of an EHR or other application) or by an 
institution or organization acting on the individual’s behalf. 
 
At the present time, only PCHR / PHR systems offer patients the ability to apply segmentation 
preferences directly to their data.  As the Tiger Team recently noted, however, even the most 
sophisticated of these systems currently provide individuals with control over only copies of 
their information.  That is, patients are not able to control the provider’s documentation or the 
flow of information once the patient releases it to another entity.223  Firms within this industry 
argue that PHRs nevertheless present the most achievable privacy solution – particularly with 
respect to segmentation – because they allow data from multiple providers to accumulate in one 
place and give patients control over how that copy of the information is then shared (or not) with 
providers and other entities.224    
 
PHRs allow patients to share data with specified providers.225  That is, patients can direct the 
health information contained in their PHR to their GP, psychiatrist, cardiologist, or all / none of 
the above.  In addition, some PHR systems function as electronic document repositories for 
medical documents received from different providers, giving patients control over which 
documents are shared with new providers.226  This method of information sharing, however, still 
does not give the patient control over the original provider record.227  Even within systems in 
which the PHR is “tethered” to a hospital or provider network, the patient cannot exercise 
complete control over the provider’s documentation from within the PHR.  Systems with 
“untethered” PHRs allow the patient to control access and grant privileges to others to use 
information within the PHR, but are not connected to a provider’s electronic system.228  Patients 
have the responsibility to manage and maintain all information, including entering it into the 
PHR or, alternatively, arranging for the information to be transferred from a specific source.229 
 
Microsoft HealthVault 
Microsoft HealthVault is a PHR that enables a user to share information either directly with other 
users or with third party programs.  When sharing a health record directly with other users, 
which could include an individual provider, HealthVault allows the user to filter out parts of the 
record.230  However, when a user shares information with a third-party “network,” which could 
include allowing a hospital to view and / or contribute information to the PHR, the user has more 
limited ability to filter out portions of the record.  In these cases, the user must grant the third 
party entity access to any parts of the record the entity has determined are necessary.231  These 
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 designations will vary and must be described fully in the privacy policy of the third party 
program and agreed to by the HealthVault user.232  Where the third-party program considers 
information in the user’s health record to be optional for its needs, the user may have the ability 
to limit access to such information, depending on the policies of the third party program.233  
HealthVault does flag records when information has been filtered in response to a query, alerting 
the recipient of the information that information is missing from the record.234  In addition, 
HealthVault allows consumers to alter professional-sourced information, but does flag such 
information as altered.235   
 
Google Health 
Google Health is a PHR that allows consumers to manage their health records in partnership with 
various institutions and EHR platforms.236  Users can link their profile to Google Health 
partners’ websites, giving the partners authority to read or automatically send and / or update 
information in the profile.237  Partners who have been given permission to view a user’s profile 
will be able to view the entire profile, even though they may only need information from a 
specific category, for example medications.238  Google Health users can also share their profiles 
with individuals, such as family members, friends, or providers, by issuing an invitation via 
email granting access to view the profile.239  However, Google Health currently does not offer 
consumers the opportunity to restrict access electronically to specific portions of their profile.240 
 
If users choose not to import their medical records through Google Health partners, they have the 
ability to enter their medical history manually.  Unlike Microsoft HealthVault, Google Health 
does not allow users to alter professional sourced information.241  Google Health was built to 
CCR standards but plans to embrace CCD standards as well.242 
 
Tolven, Inc. 
Tolven, Inc. (Tolven) has developed an open source system for enabling patient control over the 
electronic sharing of personal health information.243  Key elements of Tolven’s solution include 
acting as a secure repository for copies of a patient’s health records and enabling patients to 
control both the importation of information into the patient’s PHR and the disclosure of 
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 information from the PHR.244  As described in more detail in the International Examples section, 
this solution is currently being implemented in the Stichting RijnmondNet (RijnmondNet) pilot 
project in the Netherlands, where Dutch law requires that a patient have complete control over 
the distribution of his / her personal health information.245   
 
The Tolven platform provides each participating patient with a PHR and each participating 
clinician with a general EHR and a specialty EHR if the clinician is part of a participating 
specialty group.246  In Tolven’s solution, a patient first consents to have health records sent from 
a provider to a secure aggregation area, which can accept documents in any format, extract 
information, and record it in a format on which rules can be run to enable segmentation.247  Once 
the patient has set up the PHR, the patient can request that specific information from the 
aggregation area be copied, encrypted and distributed to the PHR.248  In this way, the patient can 
control exactly what information is transferred into his / her PHR.  In addition, when the patient 
initially establishes this connection with the aggregation area, the patient can choose to have all 
records related to that patient automatically copied and sent to the PHR from that time 
forward.249 
 
Once the patient’s health information has populated the PHR, Tolven’s system allows the patient 
to create and distribute encrypted copies of the PHR to providers within the health record bank 
environment that contain only the information the patient wants to share, again down to the 
clinical element level.250  When a copy of a PHR is missing information, Tolven’s technology 
can be configured to flag the record in a way that will indicate to the recipient that the record is 
not complete.251  Additionally, Tolven’s technology enables a patient to send a copy of his / her 
PHR to providers or any other individual outside of the health record bank environment in a 
variety of formats and is able to include a consent directive with the PHR indicating the patient’s 
privacy preferences.252  Once a record is sent to a provider or individual outside of the health 
record bank environment, however, there is no means of enforcing those consent preferences.253   
 
Private Access, Inc. 
Private Access, Inc. differs from the applications discussed above in that it currently enables 
patient control over access to personal health information only within the context of clinical 
research trials.  The company does, however, envision extending the applications of their 
technology to other areas of health information sharing, including EHRs, bio-banks and health 
information exchange.254 
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 The Private Access software platform offers patients the use of centrally-maintained consent 
directives and some granular privacy settings.  The company obtains patients’ consent and 
releases their health information in an “environment of trust”255 where they can establish and 
manage their consent regarding health or other confidential information.256  The pilot production 
of the platform in the clinical trial context allows researchers to recruit subjects who have 
characteristics that make them eligible for a particular trial.257  Patients have the ability to allow 
particular researchers access to some or all (or none) of their personal health information based 
on their personal choice and prevailing law.258  Additionally, the Private Access platform 
addresses issues related to consent preferences over time by requiring that such preferences be 
reviewed at any point that data moves or is proposed to move.259   
 
Private Access stores and manages patients’ consent directives through a technology platform 
called “PrivacyLayer,”260 which has the capability of combining federal and state laws, 
institutional policies and patient preferences into a single filter or adjudicator.261  Data seekers 
can be individuals (such as a primary care doctor or a single researcher), an entity (such as a 
hospital or pharmacy chain) or a group of entities (such as all doctors) that wish to access 
patients’ records.262  Data holders (i.e., patients) create consent directives through the use of a 
series of guides or trusted intermediaries, which educate patients through interactive tutorials.263  
A data seeker will search Private Access’s database for patients with particular characteristics264 
and, based upon a data holder’s privacy settings, some of a patient’s information may be 
visible.265  If data seekers would like to see more information than allowed through the 
PrivacyLayer platform, a message can be sent to the patient requesting access.  Patients then 
have the ability to grant access, ask for clarifying information (e.g., about the data seeker) or 
deny access.266 
  
Private Access is developing new applications that will allow for the sharing of health records 
and provide patients with the ability to redact information from a record and control with great 
specificity what information is shared.267  In addition, the company is developing Application 
Programming Interfaces (APIs) that will allow software developers to build upon or modify their 
health applications in order to access the PrivacyLayer platform, including the Private Access 
database of consents and privacy adjudication engine, and use the Private Access technology to 
enable sharing of data on the basis of patient preferences.268  However this capability is 
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 conditioned on the ability of the systems using the platform to remove or redact data that is 
meant to be segmented.269 
 
Individual Provider-controlled segmentation 
As noted above, PCHR / PHR systems allow patients to apply their segmentation preferences 
directly only to copies of their data—they have no ability to control a provider’s 
documentation.270  Segmentation systems have also been developed, however, that allow 
individual providers to act as the patient’s proxy in recording data sharing preferences, typically 
through the use of an EHR or other application.  The systems described below provide examples 
of technology solutions for use by the individual provider in implementing segmentation 
preferences—either those of the patient or those based upon the provider’s own judgment. 
 
e-MDs 
e-MDs provides EHR solutions that currently work off of local servers as opposed to central or 
regional servers.  The platform automatically defines certain categories of information as 
“sensitive” or “private” based on state and federal law, typically including information related to 
mental health, substance abuse, STIs and HIV.271  However, e-MDs also offers providers an 
option to mark additional information as “private” in order to accommodate patient 
preferences.272  Through the use of “meta tags,” the provider can mark information as 
confidential in several areas of the EHR.273    
 
In the health summary section of the EHR, for example, a provider can select a customizable 
template that will automatically tag predefined information, such as HIV status, as 
confidential.274  Alternatively, or in addition to the default set of privacy tags, providers can mark 
individual data elements as confidential at the time the information is entered into the record; this 
allows providers to engage in a dialogue with patients regarding their preferences during the 
course of a clinical encounter.  All information marked as private in the health summary is 
blacked out when viewed by someone without the required access privilege, thus indicating that 
confidential information exists in the record.275  If a medication has been marked as private in 
the medications section of the summary, a note will indicate that the patient has been prescribed
a medication, but will divulge no further information.
 
 
                                                
276
 
In the progress notes section of the EHR, where free text is entered, e-MDs enables meta tags to 
be attached to any text the patient wishes to keep private.  The software has insertion points at 
every sentence, allowing the provider to tag individual sentences as confidential.277  As in the 
case of the health summary section, an individual without necessary privileges who attempts to 
view the document will see blacked out text where sentences have been marked private.278   
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Although information marked private in e-MDs appears as blacked out text when viewed in the 
summary record, providers have options regarding redacted information when exporting or 
printing.  The provider can print or export a version of the EHR with the private information 
blacked out, thus indicating that information has been redacted, or the provider can choose to 
print or export a version in which the confidential information is missing completely, thus 
providing no indication that the record is incomplete.279 Additionally, providers who choose to 
export the document as a CCR can export the document with or without the confidential 
information.  This functionality will soon be expanded to the exporting of documents as a CCD 
as well.280 
 
While e-MDs has not implemented its privacy system across other EHRs (it is a user-driven 
feature built in to this particular technology), the data transferred via CCR and CCD conform to 
standards that are readable and interpretable by other systems.  Until the receiving systems are 
able to recognize the privacy tags applied by e-MDs, however, they will not be able to identify 
the information as confidential and treat it appropriately.281 
 
According to recent testimony, the software’s privacy-enabling technology, in particular the 
provider’s ability to mark data as sensitive, has not been widely utilized.282  However, one 
exception to this may be instances where employees of a facility also happen to be patients at the 
same facility.  In these cases, the function enabling restriction of access by particular users has 
been employed more frequently.283   
 
Texas Department of State Health Services Clinical Management for Behavioral Health Services 
(CMBHS) 
CMBHS is an EHR system developed to serve behavioral health and substance abuse providers 
in the state of Texas.284  The system implements role-based security that allows the sharing of 
health information based on a patient’s consent preferences.285  Data segmentation with 
significant granularity is enabled by the system, although it is not interoperable: electronic 
exchange occurs only among providers using the same system. 
 
The data in a patient’s record are separated by category, such as intake assessment or substance 
abuse assessment, and each type of data is stored as a separate document on a central 
database.286  This system enables access controls to be applied to each data type, allowing th
patient to release the entire record or segment categories in order to exchange only specific 
data.
e 
                                                
287  For example, a patient could completely hide progress notes or a substance abuse 
assessment.288  During a patient encounter, the provider works with the patient to complete an 
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 electronic consent form that indicates which types of clinical documents may be released, whi
providers may have access to those documents, a date range for access and an expiration date of 
the consent.
ch 
t 
m, 
less 
formation.    
a 
ng toward more standard coding and is planning to enable electronic 
xchange in the future.295 
s have 
 
 
ses, 
ive” or 
discussion of the organizations themselves, we provide a few examples of the third-party systems 
                                                
289  Hard copies of the consent form are completed, printed, and signed by the patien
before being saved in the CMBHS system.290  Once the consent form is saved in the syste
specified providers have access to the information until the expiration date of the consent un
it is revoked prior to the expiration date.291  In addition, once information is shared with one 
provider in the system, other providers within that provider’s organization can access the 
292in
 
Currently, the CMBHS system does not allow for interoperable electronic exchange—its 
developers explain that, because the systems reside on a central database and have utilized 
significant amount of customized coding, interoperability has not yet been possible.293  At 
present, each system can only connect to primary health care providers, for example, via fax.294  
However, CMBHS is movi
e
 
Other Systems 
In addition to PHCR / PHR models that allow patients to apply their information sharing 
preferences directly to copies of their data and systems where individual providers segment 
patient data based either on patient preferences or their own judgment, a number of system
been developed that operationalize data segmentation instead at the organizational level, 
although they vary widely in both design and application.  Whereas an EHR such as e-MDs 
might incorporate functionality that allows a practitioner to segment data as part of his / her 
interaction with an EHR, other systems might, for example, utilize a layer of software in addition
to an EHR that executes segmentation rules on data within the system.  That is, an organization 
might design its policies and infrastructure to allow for standard data segmentation and patient 
consent options across all users, and might execute those policies through the use of overarching
technology applied to data within the system.  Some systems do so through the use of a Service 
Oriented Architecture (SOA) solution,296 while others might utilize third-party applications such 
as consent management systems that act as an outside rules or intelligence engine.  In both ca
the system itself articulates the rules and policies to be implemented by the technology.  The 
systems discussed briefly below provide examples of a few of these types of “collaborat
“hybrid” systems—organizations that allow for data segmentation with some degree of 
granularity through the system-wide implementation of policies and rules.  Following a 
 
289 Mitra, supra note 197. 
290 Texas Department of State Health Services. BHIPS Functionality Definition, March 7, 2010. Available at: 
http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/sa/BHIPS/functionality.shtm. 
291 Id. 
292 Phone call with Debabrata Mitra, supra note 206. 
293 Id. 
294 Id. 
295 Id. 
296 Service-oriented architectures are web-based, third party services that offer data routing and management 
services.  These systems can also act as intermediaries between different computer languages. See Sprott, D. and L. 
Wilkes. “Understanding Service-Oriented Architecture,” MSDN Library, January 2004. Available at: 
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa480021.aspx. 
GW SPHHS   
Department of Health Policy 
46
 
 that organizations might choose to utilize in addition to their own technology infrastructure for 
data segmentation and consent management purposes. 
 
Users 
 
The Massachusetts eHealth Collaborative 
MAeHC’s pilot electronic exchange program provides an example of data segmentation enabled 
at the organizational level.  That is, the rules and protocols for the sharing of information within 
the system are determined by the HIO (as opposed to individual providers, provider groups, or 
patients).  The HIO’s policies, however, were developed with the input of key stakeholders, 
including consumer-focused organizations, and the help of steering committees in each of the 
participating communities.297 
 
MAeHC gives participating providers access to a community repository of clinical summaries, 
including data on patient problems, procedures, allergies, medications, demographics, smoking 
status, diagnosis, lab results, and radiology reports.298  The HIO itself predefined information 
that it considered sensitive, including HIV status, genetic information and mental health 
information, and created access controls to segment that data at the exchange level, preventing 
the sensitive information from being part of the repository to which providers had access.299  If 
the participating provider’s EHR system had a rules engine, the filtering of the sensitive 
information, as defined by MAeHC, would occur at the EHR level before the record was sent to 
the exchange.  However, if the EHR involved did not have such a rules engine, filtering occurred 
at the exchange level.  Data coming into the exchange would be processed by a rules engine 
capable of stripping out data types defined as sensitive by the exchange.300 
 
MAeHC therefore has the infrastructure with which to segment patient data, but has determined 
at the outset what types of information will be segmented by the system.  The patient has no 
input at the point of segmentation regarding what data should be segmented and what should not; 
nor, for that matter, does the provider—at least not directly. 
 
Kaiser Permanente 
In 2002, Kaiser Permanente partnered with Epic Systems Corporation to create and implement a 
program-wide integrated EHR—KP HealthConnect.  The system combines an EHR system with 
a tethered PHR system,301 through which patients have web-based access to portions of their 
health record and can send secure messages to clinicians as well as schedule appointments.  The 
data collected by the EHR system includes both coded and free text information related to patient 
demographics; appointments; encounters (including diagnosis and procedure codes); 
prescriptions; lab tests; and longitudinal records of vital signs.302  The system maintains control 
over the categories of information contained in the EHR. 
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 Although HealthConnect has a common national governance, each region of Kaiser Permanente 
may implement it somewhat differently according to local needs.303  Uniform data definitions 
and semantic interoperability are maintained through the use of an internally-developed 
terminology solution.304  However, policy decisions regarding segmentation of information in 
the health record may vary depending on the laws in each area.  For example, HealthConnect in 
the Mid-Atlantic region restricts access to behavioral health records only to behavioral hea
providers due to state laws prohibiting the exchange of such information without patient 
consent.
lth 
305  Additionally, developers of this policy felt that segmenting on the basis of 
department, such as behavioral health, made it easier for providers to understand what 
information they were and were not receiving in a record.306 
 
Veterans Health Administration 
The VHA within the VA operates one of the first electronic health information systems in the 
U.S., the Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA).307  
Components of VistA are operational in all of the VHA’s 1,400 clinical centers; clinical data are 
stored at 129 local data centers and is gradually being migrated to four regional data processing 
centers.308 
 
VistA’s primary clinician access software provides a single interface for physicians and other 
health care providers to use in reviewing and updating a patient’s medical record.309  The patient 
data collected and organized includes an active problem list, allergies, current medications, lab 
results, vital signs, hospitalization records and outpatient clinic history.310  Providers search for a 
patient and, after finding the patient in the system, can request the patient’s health record.311  
Information will be returned to the provider on the basis of access controls enforced by security 
and privacy policies.312  Within the VHA, personnel have access to all or part of a patient’s 
record depending on their clinical role, with the exception of information on drug and alcohol 
abuse, HIV status, and sickle cell anemia, all of which require written consent for disclosure 
pursuant to a statutory mandate.313  Additionally, personnel have the ability to “declare 
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 emergency” to gain full access to a patient’s record in the case of emergency.314  Patients can 
also access their record online through “My HealtheVet,” which functions much like a PHR.315   
 with 
ate 
r 
the 
                                                
 
Currently, VHA’s pilot with Kaiser Permanente in San Diego (described above) is in limited 
production, with fewer than 300 participating patients out of 1,200 in the population base.316  
The San Diego pilot enforces general opt-in or opt-out preferences,317 collected using paper-
based consent directives, but does not allow more granular consent options at this time.318  
Utilizing a federated consent model, the pilot requires patients to sign a consent agreement
each organization that may produce or share their information, which in the case of the pilot 
includes only Kaiser Permanente.319  Thus, as currently implemented, patients must negoti
their consent preferences and choices with each provider.320  The pilot’s default organizational 
policy then allows providers from each of those organizations to assert the role of medical docto
and obtain access to patient information.  At the time of exchange, a policy engine applies 
patient’s preferences to the patient’s data and redacts any information that should not be 
exchanged.321 
 
Expansion of the pilot to Hampton, Virginia is planned for early 2011 and will include additional 
features, such as an electronic consent directive that identifies veterans’ preferences using 
standard-based semantics, roles, and concept codes,322 and possibly more granular consent.323  
The use cases for the project, which include allowing a patient to hide medications from specific 
providers; allowing an emergency access override; and allowing protection of a patient’s 
genomic data, would all support potential utilization of data segmentation with significant 
granularity.324 
 
The VA’s newest pilot project will take place in Indianapolis in partnership with the Indiana 
Health Information Exchange.325  The Indiana pilot will use the same technology as that in 
development in San Diego, but will use a face-to-face consent process between patients and a VA 
representative (as opposed to a provider). 
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 Tools 
 
Indivo 
Indivo is a “tethered” PHR system that was developed and released by the Children’s Hospital 
Informatics Program at Harvard.   As implemented at Children’s Hospital Boston (CHB), Indivo 
offers some segmentation capabilities.326  The patient’s PHR can be populated with data from 
patients themselves as well as from electronic data feeds and manual entry from CHB clinical 
records.327  Indivo’s design excludes sensitive data, such as HIV status, from the record.328  
While in the future Indivo plans to allow electronic data feeds from primary care providers and 
others outside of the CHB system, at this time clinical data is sourced from CHB systems 
only.329  Thus, patients can add information such as blood sugar measurements to their Indivo 
PHR, but cannot load data from providers outside the hospital system into the record.  The
patient, however, does have the ability to share information with outside entities, includin
providers, by e-mailing a copy of the record.
 
g other 
                                                
330  Additionally, patients may share information 
with those outside the CHB system by inviting providers, schools or others to create an Indivo 
account and access the patient’s information through Indivo.331  The patient has the ability to 
hide medications, problems, documents or results from any individual given access to their PHR 
via this means.332   
 
Indivo is an open source solution, developed to be extended and customized.  The latest version 
of the software, Indivo X Alpha 3, is in alpha release for developers only333 and has the 
capability for simple role-based access control.334  That is, patients can create groups, and 
documents within the record can be shared or withheld from individuals granted access to the 
record based on the individual’s relationship with the patient.  For example, settings could be 
created to give all doctors full access to the record while entities such as schools are only given 
access to immunization records.335  Indivo X may also increase the granularity of data within the 
system by using a data processing pipeline to segment data elements from documents in the 
record and enable sharing of more relevant data with third-party applications such as wellness 
programs.336  They have pre-selected a group of basic fields to segment, including allergies, 
encounters, immunizations and problem lists, among others.337    
 
 
326 Bourgeois, F.C. et al. “MyChildren’s: Integration of a Personally Controlled Health Record with a Tethered 
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 InterSystems 
InterSystems’ HealthShare product implements a consent mechanism within a centralized health 
exchange system that maintains an index of patients but allows facilities and institutions to 
maintain control of the information they collect.  The HealthShare consent service is capable of 
merging consent policies, or rules regarding what / to what extent information sharing is allowed, 
from several entities, including the community or jurisdiction, the facility and the patient, and 
then applying the proper policy rules to the data in question.338  Providers who request a patient’s 
record can query the system and, based on the preferences of the patient, facility and jurisdiction, 
the system returns an aggregated health record with data pulled from each facility or provider 
that has a record for the same patient.  Currently, InterSystems does not offer a patient portal to 
capture consent preferences; consent typically is collected either via a paper form or verbally in a 
facility where the patient visits, and then is entered electronically by authorized facility staff.339  
InterSystems has also developed a web-based application that allows a provider to connect to the 
system and input records and that is adjustable based on user preferences.340   
 
HealthShare approaches consent management in two ways—patient matching and clinical data.  
A first-phase consent filter is applied when a search is made for a particular patient.341  When the 
centralized system receives a request for patient matching data, the database only returns 
information if the patient has agreed to be listed in the system.  Patients can select a date range 
for which the filter is active, and can define which groups or users can receive their patient 
matching data.342 
 
A second-phase consent filter is applied after the patient is identified and returns only portions of 
the records that the patient has agreed to share.  For example, patients can restrict access to 
certain data types, such as lab results or allergies, or to certain classes of information, such as 
HIV status or genomic test results.  Patients can also restrict access to information by date range, 
or to specific groups or users.343  In all cases regarding segmentation of clinical data, however, 
providers viewing a record are able to see whether information has been filtered and / or 
information is missing.344  A provider will receive a note with the record stating that information 
is missing due to the patient’s consent policies.345  An additional filtering feature enables a 
provider to “break the glass” and access masked data, although a facility may choose to take 
away this function if it conflicts with its or the jurisdiction’s privacy policies.346  Also, 
InterSystems is capable of embedding a patient’s consent policy with the data if the data flows 
outside of the exchange community; however, there is currently no means available to 
communicate an update or change in the patient’s consent preferences.347 
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 InterSystems has focused on compatibility with a wide range of data standards in order to make a 
variety of systems interoperable.  It has created a software solution to translate standardized data 
received from other clinical systems, as well as that received from regional and national health 
information systems.  In addition, although not available publicly at this time, InterSystems is 
pursuing an approach that would allow intelligent parsing of free text for the purpose of tagging 
relevant information with clinical codes so that consent filters can be applied.348  Although 
InterSystems cannot support every standard, it has the ability to customize data transformation 
and enable compatibility with various data standards.349  Still, a key technical challenge for 
InterSystems is the variation among vendor systems that often requires customization to enable 
integration.350  Currently, the software is being used for electronic exchange only among 
organizations within the same HIO.351 
  
InterSystems has been a part of developing health exchanges that include privacy policies with 
data segmentation in both Sweden and the Netherlands.  As explained further in the International 
Examples section below, Sweden has implemented HealthShare, using its technology to translate 
medical records found in existing local formats into a common standard for the national patient 
record exchange.  The exchange distributes patient information only to providers who have 
patient approval, and providers only receive information pertinent to their area of medicine 
(which, in turn, is defined by municipalities).  In the Netherlands, the National IT Institute for 
Healthcare (NICTIZ) uses the InterSystems Ensemble product to handle authentication and 
authorization of system users and logging health information transactions for auditing. 
 
HIPAAT 
HIPAAT’s SOA provides a “consent engine” that allows providers to implement privacy policies 
within their existing EHR systems.352  HIPAAT offers providers a computerized interface, 
Privacy eSuite, to create consent preferences on behalf of patients.  Additionally, Privacy eSuite 
acts as a decision engine and adjudicates requests to access personal health information.353 
HIPAAT also offers a PHR or patient portal, myConsentMinder, that enables patients to input 
their own consent preferences.354  myConsentMinder utilizes simple web-based consent forms 
that are similar to the HIPAA privacy notices typically filled out by patients in a provider’s 
office.355  The patient input system gives detailed instructions and provides many of the same 
features found on paper forms, such as check boxes and explanations for information sharing 
options.356 
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 HIPAAT implements privacy policies in three categories—consumer, organizational, and 
jurisdictional.357  Thus, in addition to allowing patients to create consent directives, HIPAAT’s 
software tools can allow administrators to create organizational privacy policies, such as “allow 
all providers to access all patients’ PHI,” as well as jurisdictional policies, for example “restrict 
disclosure of mental health records.”358  A critical component is that, in all of its applications so 
far, HIPAAT defaults to the policies of the organization and jurisdiction; consumer preferences 
can only be accommodated to the extent that they do not conflict. 
 
Once privacy policies are recorded in the consent engine, consent preferences are translated into 
an access control policy language so that HIPAAT’s Consent Validation Service can allow or 
deny access to the relevant information, or deny access but allow an override. Additionally, 
HIPAAT’s technology can be configured to inform a provider that information has been filtered 
out of the record.359 
 
HIPAAT’s consent management system allows patients to restrict access based on any 
combination of the following:  purpose of use, type of data, who is accessing the data (which can 
include an individual provider, a type of provider, a department or an entire facility) and date 
range.360  In order to enable the actual segmentation of the data, however, HIPAAT depends on 
the EHR or PHR to provide data that is structured enough to implement the policy.361  For 
example, if a system intends to give patients the option of excluding a particular provider from 
receiving information concerning a diagnosis of diabetes, HIPAAT needs data in the EHR to be 
structured in a way that provides an identifier for data associated with a diagnosis of diabetes. 
 
HIPAAT works in a similar way as the InterSystems software in that it coordinates data sharing 
across different systems with certain criteria.  As long as an EHR’s data can be structured in a 
way that includes “information identifiers,” HIPAAT’s consent management operates across 
systems.362  The system, however, does not segment data itself and relies on a compatible 
sharing network when sharing the data. 
                                                
 
HIPAAT’s capabilities will not be ready for full implementation until late 2011.363  The company 
is currently in the testing phase for use in an HIO that includes a group of hospitals and 
providers.  HIPAAT also participated with the VA in an interoperability test and was able to share 
consent policies with the VA.364   
 
International Examples 
International efforts to accommodate patient consent preferences through the use of data 
segmentation have faced challenges similar to those existing in the United States, including legal 
issues, incompatible local systems and a lack of common standards and terminologies.  
Approaches to addressing these issues have varied and this section presents a few illustrative 
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 examples of those efforts.  For example, Sweden has taken a top-down approach by rewriting 
laws thought to hinder electronic exchange and creating mandates that require participation by 
county councils and the use of particular standards by hospitals.365  Another approach has been 
taken in Canada, where a not-for-profit organization was created to work with regional 
authorities to create a privacy baseline for the exchange of health information and a conceptual 
privacy and security architecture that allows segmentation (“masking”) of sensitive information. 
 
Sweden 
Sweden is in the process of designing and deploying the National Patient Summary (NPÖ)366 to 
allow for the sharing of information across hospitals and practitioners throughout the country.367  
Particular challenges identified with regard to establishing the NPÖ included a lack of common 
terminology and information models, legislation that impeded the sharing of information across 
counties and a long tradition of local autonomy.368  In Sweden, health care is a responsibility of 
each local county council, and the law originally barred counties from exchanging patient health 
information.369  After the national legislative body changed the law, however, counties studied 
possible solutions for sharing information while protecting patient privacy.370  Creators of the 
NPÖ decided that a full-scale national solution should be based on existing systems, which 
meant separating the information into volumes that were compatible with the existing 
technology.371  Information volumes in the NPÖ now include patient demographics, symptoms, 
diagnosis, resolutions, medicines, care contacts, treatment documents, patient status, care 
planning, and examination results.   
 
As described briefly above, Sweden hired InterSystems to implement HealthShare so that the 
NPÖ could transform data from many different local formats into a centralized format for each of 
the volumes within the index.372  Although 100 percent of primary care services and between 80 
and 90 percent of hospital care services in Sweden are digitized, the systems are not 
interoperable.373  HealthShare is capable of translating between a variety of different medical 
vocabularies; however, the Swedish county governments, which have developed EHR systems 
within their hospitals, must develop translation map tables in order for HealthShare to convert 
the data for use in the centralized system.374  The project is moving forward on an incremental 
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 basis, linking one county to the system at a time.375  To date, of the 21 Swedish counties, only 
Örebro and Östergötland have been linked to the exchange.376 
 
Once the data has been standardized, the Swedish system will be able to control access based on 
patient / provider relationships and consent using a rules database attached to the index to 
regulate access to patient records.  First, a provider will swipe a personal card to access the 
system.  The rules database will filter clinical information based on the provider’s role in the 
hospital and the information from each of the volumes that the county council has determined 
that doctor should be able to see.  Next, the system will verify that the patient has consented for 
that doctor to obtain the information and whether that consent is still within the period of 
validity.  Finally, the system will establish a “patient relation” between the doctor and the patient 
within the record for future requests.377  The system is designed to segment data based on 
individual county determinations of who should be able to see each specific type of data in the 
record; individual patients do not have the ability to segment specific information by data 
element.378 
 
Within the two Swedish counties currently participating in the NPÖ there are 300 active clinical 
users and more than 1,000,000 patients using the system.379  The NPÖ planned to add three 
additional county councils during the first half of 2010, and all 21 counties by 2012.380 
 
The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS) is in the process of rolling out a 
nationwide EHR that allows for a limited degree of data granularity and segmentation.  The NHS 
Care Record Service (CRS) is built around the Summary Care Record (SCR), also referred to as 
the “spine,” a centralized database that is structured to house patient demographic information, 
medication reactions, allergy information, information on chronic health conditions, test and x-
ray results, and contextual information on the patient (e.g., medically relevant home and work 
information).381  Future functionalities are planned to include the ability to upload discharge 
summaries from in-patient and outpatient clinics, “out of hours” encounters, and information 
input by patients themselves via the NHS HealthSpace website, which currently only allows 
patients to view their SCR.382 
 
Participation in the SCR is based on an opt-out with restrictions consent model.383  In January 
2009, the NHS, through ten Strategic Health Authorities, began sending out informational 
packets informing all citizens over the age of sixteen of the SCR and their options for 
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 participation.  In order to opt out of the system, patients (or their legal guardian) must return a 
form to their GP.  If this form is not received within twelve weeks, the patient’s GP may send the 
record to the central SCR database.384  Once in the database, a given SCR may be accessed by 
any practitioner with a compliant SCR system and a clinical relationship with the patient.  Within 
practices, access is mediated by role-based access control, which restricts some personnel from 
accessing the entire record (e.g., non-clinical personnel may be restricted only to demographic 
information).385  Further, at each clinical encounter, patients must give “permission to view” to 
the clinician before their record can be accessed (the patient also has the option of waiving this 
step by granting permission to view for all subsequent visits, or until permission is revoked).386 
 
Beyond opting out and granting or denying permission to view one’s SCR to individual 
practitioners, patients may also request that a clinician not input a given data element into their 
record.  This request may be made for any data element except information relating to 
medications, allergies, or adverse drug reactions.387  An additional functionality is planned that 
will allow patients to “seal” information in their record.388  Sealed portions of the record will not 
be able to be accessed without express consent, but their existence is indicated within the SCR.  
An additional function, “seal and lock,” will allow the patient to hide the presence of selected 
information entirely.389  There is no timeline for implementation of this feature, however, and 
patients who currently wish to mask information relating to medications, allergies, or adverse 
drug reactions are advised to opt out of the SCR (as these data cannot be excluded from the 
record by patient request).390 
 
Canada 
Canada Health Infoway, Inc. (Infoway) is a not-for-profit organization working in collaboration 
with Canada’s 14 provinces and territories to establish the framework and standards for an 
interoperable, nationwide EHR based on interconnected regional systems.391  While differences 
exist in the provinces’ privacy statutes, all individuals have the option of limiting the disclosure 
of their health information for treatment through “lockbox” provisions.  These provisions vary by 
province and territory, affording individuals the option of restricting disclosure of some or all of 
their electronic health information, depending on the jurisdiction.392  The Pan-Canadian Health 
Information Privacy and Confidentiality Framework grew out of an attempt to harmonize the 
various privacy provisions and serves as a baseline for provincial consent rules.393  Among other 
provisions, the framework states that the individual has the right to withdraw consent to share 
information; however, that withdrawal of consent can be overridden in an emergency.  A provider 
sharing segmented information must inform the recipient that masked information exists.394  
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 Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the health provider to notify the patient of any consequences 
of withholding certain data.395 
 
Infoway has also developed a conceptual privacy and security architecture for use in building 
EHRs across Canada that incorporates the framework provisions described above.  In particular, 
the architecture includes the ability to mask health data at the data element level; to mask health 
data from specific providers; to override masking; and to create repositories storing patient 
consent directives.396  This conceptual architecture is designed to be flexible enough to enable 
different jurisdictions to implement privacy and consent features consistent with their local 
requirements, including masking or segmentation features.  To date, masking functions are being 
used in several e-health projects in Canada.397  For example, British Columbia’s PharmaNet e-
health project allows patients to limit access to information by asking the pharmacist to attach a 
keyword to the file.  In this way, only pharmacists with whom the patient shares the keyword 
will have access to the file.  An emergency override is available, however, if considered 
necessary for treatment.398 
 
The Netherlands 
The Dutch National Healthcare Information Hub (LSP) is built around remote information hubs 
connected to a national database.  The system maintains records at the practitioner or regional 
level that are available through a searchable database accessible to eligible practitioners 
throughout the country (i.e., those who meet a set of minimum security and functionality 
requirements).399  While consent to share medical information is implied for treatment purposes, 
patients have the option of segmenting data based on provider, care delivery setting, and data 
type, and may also opt out of the exchange entirely.400 
 
The Stichting RijnmondNet (RijnmondNet) pilot project in the Netherlands is an electronic 
exchange serving hospitals, clinicians and patients in an area of the Netherlands near 
Rotterdam.401  As mentioned above, the project utilizes the open source system developed by 
Tolven, Inc. to enable patient control over the electronic sharing of personal health 
information.402  In keeping with Dutch law, RijnmondNet is patient-focused, enabling the patient 
to control the distribution of his / her personal health information with considerable 
granularity.403  For example, a patient can control access to particular sections of personal health 
information and can grant or deny access to either individuals or to groups.404  The system 
accomplishes this goal by making and distributing encrypted copies of the information on the 
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 basis of the patient’s preferences and at the patient’s request, rather than controlling access by 
denying or granting particular users the ability to view information in the health record. 
In the RijnmondNet pilot, a patient first must opt in to participate in the exchange, providing 
consent for his / her records to be transferred from the clinical environment to a secure 
aggregation area.  Although patient records are transferred in one format only, Tolven’s 
technology is capable of receiving documents in the aggregation area in any format.405  The 
aggregation area is a secure environment where neither patients nor clinicians are able to view or 
access documents.  Documents coming into the aggregation area are organized by patient and are 
processed by Tolven’s rules engine, which applies syntax-based rules to create semantically 
interoperable and computable documents that can support granular segmentation of the patient’s 
health record.406   
 
In addition to accommodating Dutch law requiring consent for the exchange of a patient’s health 
records, Tolven’s implementation for the RijnmondNet exchange must accommodate complex 
Dutch laws regarding the health records of minors.  In the Netherlands there is a gradation of 
parental access to minors’ electronic health records on the basis of the minor’s age.407  As a 
minor ages and is granted expanded control over his / her health record, and as parental rights 
diminish, Tolven’s system automatically computes and enforces the necessary changes in access. 
 
Segmentation in Contexts Other than Health Care 
Use of data segmentation in industries and contexts other than health care provides an 
opportunity for comparison with its use in the health care sector.  Moreover, analysis of its uses 
in other industries provides data on how the public views privacy and the amount of control 
people generally desire over their personal information in other areas of their lives.  Industries 
other than health care must also balance consumer privacy rights with beneficial reasons for 
collecting their personal information—many of which stem from consumers’ own desires.  
Facebook and TiVo in particular have implemented data segmentation methods that offer various 
granular options for consumers. 
 
Industries other than health care also provide examples of the various barriers (both perceived 
and actual) the health care industry faces when implementing data segmentation.  For example, 
the extent of granular control over personal data in other industries has seemingly fluctuated 
along with consumer demand.  As described in more detail below, Facebook recently 
implemented the option of using simplistic controls over the sharing of data after a short period 
of time when the platform essentially offered only very detailed individual control (or none). 
 
Facebook 
The evolution of Facebook’s privacy policies and practices provides a useful case study of the 
complexity of meeting consumer privacy demands in the context of granular data segmentation.  
Facebook, a social networking site, requires consumers to create a “profile” and connect with 
people identified as “friends.”  Information is entered into the application from the outset into 
established data type fields, such as “Name,” “Hometown,” “E-mail,” “Hobbies,”  “Political 
Views,” etc.  Members can also add photographs individually or divided into albums.  The 
                                                 
405 Jones, supra note 247, at 1. 
406 Id. 
407 Wet op de Geneeskundige Behandelingsovereenkomst (Dutch Medical Contract Act 1995) (NETH.). 
GW SPHHS   
Department of Health Policy 
58
 
 platform is built on the idea of transparency and sharing of an individual’s information, which 
has occasionally sparked public controversy408 in response to the company’s request for 
progressively more user information.409 
 
In response to user criticism that its privacy policy allowed too much unwanted sharing, 
Facebook changed the policy in December 2009 to allow users to indicate who could have access 
to the information within each data set, as well as each photo or album.  The company sent a 
message to all users upon login that alerted them to the change, encouraged them to review / 
update their privacy preferences, and provided them with a link for doing so.  The default 
settings, however, allowed all internet users to view members’ general profile information, 
including picture, gender and age—thereby allowing users’ information to be more exposed 
rather than less.410  Status updates, photos, and other information were defaulted to the “friends 
of friends” setting.411  Additionally, profile pictures, names, gender, current city, networks, and 
lists of friends were permanently public information, with no option for consumers to opt out.412  
As a result, third party “facebook-enhanced” applications could access this information 
regardless of user-chosen privacy settings. 
 
The December 2009 privacy policy was criticized for being too complicated and not providing 
its members adequate instruction on how to use the available privacy tools.  In response, the 
company quickly launched a “privacy guide” that can be accessed on the Facebook homepage or 
from a person’s profile.413  The guide is intended to explain the privacy policy and basic terms 
and walk users step-by-step through setting up preferences.  The onus is still on the user, 
however, to seek out the guide in order to implement stricter controls than Facebook’s default 
sharing policy. 
 
The company also issued a revised policy in May 2010 that offers simplistic controls in addition 
to offering the same detailed level of granularity.  Users can now determine how much basic 
information is shared with the exception of name, profile picture, gender and networks, which 
are still permanently public information.414  Specifically, users can grant access to other users of 
Facebook that they have organized into broad categories of people (e.g., “friends” or “friends of 
friends”) by selecting the particular category or can customize their sharing on an individual 
level by granting a specific individual user access, which allows them to decide exactly who can 
view which pieces of information.  The May 2010 policy also allows users to choose whether to 
share their information with applications or websites.415  In line with the company’s philosophy 
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 that encourages information sharing, the default setting recommends that users share information 
in all of the broad categories Facebook offers, including the availability of members’ profile 
information, status updates, and photos, to all internet users.  The default policy would also allow 
the “friends of friends” category to view members’ birthdays, religious and political views, and 
photos and videos that a member has been “tagged” in (i.e., identified by another member).  The 
“friends only” category would be able to view this information, in addition to members’ email 
addresses, phone numbers and address. 
 
Facebook provides an example of an electronic platform that allows users to exercise highly 
granular control over personal information.  The program, however, requires users to enter data 
into strictly-defined categories, thereby avoiding the problem of separating commingled data.  In 
addition, Facebook’s categories apply across all profiles and users of the program.  Within health 
care, however, different organizations utilize different EHRs, which do not consistently define 
categories of data or use the same technical interfaces.  Just as a Facebook privacy setting could 
not apply to information shared on Twitter (a social networking program with similar uses but 
completely different data categories), different EHRs and PHRs categorize medical information 
in different ways.  As a result, a Facebook-style privacy policy could only work within health 
care if all EHRs and PHRs adopted consistently-defined categories of information in addition to 
the same technical interface. 
 
Facebook’s experience also illustrates the issues raised by providing a great degree of user 
control over granularity in data types without instruction—the company’s new privacy guide is 
an acknowledgment of this gap.  As noted recently by the Tiger Team, the ability of individuals 
to exercise this capability remains unclear.416  HIOs could face similar concerns when 
implementing a privacy policy that allows consumers to express preferences with regard to 
segmenting data (or to segment the data themselves) within, for example, PHR or PCHR models.  
They will need to ensure that patients are aware of default settings up front and are given clear 
instructions on what options are available and how to make changes.  As the scope of an 
electronic exchange grows, entities will need to evaluate privacy policies on a continual basis to 
ensure that they align with and enable the breadth of sharing made available by the exchange.  
Consumers will also need a user-friendly system to be able to select which data should be shared 
with which users. 
 
Finally, as also noted by the Tiger Team, the most notable difference between Facebook’s data 
segmentation design and those under development in the health care sector is that Facebook 
users maintain unilateral access and control over their own data.  Personal information within the 
health care sector, however, is (and likely will always be to some extent) generated and stored by 
a variety of entities in addition to the individual.417 
 
TiVo 
TiVo, Inc. (TiVo), which produces digital video recording (DVR) devices and provides related 
services connecting consumers to digital media, uses data segmentation to extract information 
about its customers’ viewing habits.  TiVo places protections on “personally identifiable viewing 
information,” which refers to information about a customer’s viewing habits that can be used to 
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 identify the customer.418  Unless a customer gives prior consent, TiVo does not collect or access 
the personally identifiable viewing information of that customer except as necessary for 
servicing.419  According to its privacy policy, TiVo does use its recording devices to gather 
anonymous data about a customer’s viewing habits, which includes the customer’s viewing 
choices, but does not identify the customer’s household or include any demographic or personal 
information.420  Customers can, however, elect to block TiVo from collecting anonymous 
viewing information.421 
 
TiVo “boxes” connect to large servers and have the capability both to receive and send 
information.422  The company gives customers three options for information sharing via a TiVo 
box.  The default option is considered “opt neutral” which allows the collection of viewing 
information but separates the information from an account and detaches it from the specific TiVo 
box.  Viewers can opt out of sharing even this information by selecting an option through the 
box’s software.  Finally, viewers can opt in to sharing their viewing information as tied to their 
personal account information.423 
 
TiVo has an elaborate method of segmenting the data for the “opt-neutral” option.  If a viewer 
does not specifically opt in, viewing information received by TiVo servers is automatically 
separated from any information that could be used to match it to individual receivers or 
subscribers.  Account information and anonymous viewing data are stored in separate systems.424  
Viewing data is then randomly transferred to one of a number of different servers for storage.  
File transfer logs are turned off and timestamps are erased from the data every three hours.  
These measures were implemented to enable the use of anonymous viewing data for customers 
who do not opt in specifically to sharing their viewing information.425 
 
TiVo provides an example of a company’s ability to separate data at the consumer’s direction for 
purposes of limiting identifiability.  When information is first transferred from a TiVo box to a 
server, it is identifiable and can be associated with a specific household.  TiVo’s hardware / 
software combination then removes the identifiable information in accordance with the default 
option or the preference expressed by the TiVo subscriber.  Notably, TiVo’s system separates very 
specific data from every TiVo box as opposed to enabling a granular set of choices.  That is, TiVo 
itself establishes the criteria for segmentation and does not adjust those criteria according to the 
preference of the consumer.  As previously discussed, within health care, patients may want to 
segment different data depending on their personal circumstances and the entities with which 
they are sharing their health information.  In addition, since TiVo customers purchase their DVR 
boxes from the company, the information being transmitted by each individual box uses the same 
format and terminology.  In the health care industry, different EHRs use different data formats 
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 and terminologies, creating an additional barrier to implementing similar data segmentation 
methods. 
 
Web Spiders 
The term “web spiders” refers broadly to programs developed to search websites and retrieve 
web documents from the internet, either by following hypertext links or other methods.426  Web 
spiders are used in various applications for the purpose of personal searching (finding web 
documents of interest to an individual user), as well as for building collections of web pages, 
archiving particular websites or providing statistics.427  The web analysis conducted by spiders 
can include content-based analysis, which examines the body of the text to determine its 
relevance, or link-based approaches.428 
 
Search engines, such as Google, Yahoo, and Bing index web content to make it searchable by 
sending web spiders around the internet to copy information from websites and update the index.  
Web designers can prevent spiders from copying information from their website in two standard 
ways.  The first method, known as the Robots Exclusion Protocol, involves creating a 
“robots.txt” file in the website’s root directory.429  This file contains rules that explain which 
sections of the website are open for indexing and which parts of the website are off limits.  Web 
designers have highly granular options in creating a “robots.txt” file.  First, the designer can limit 
access to areas by specific spider-type (“who”).  Also, designers can limit what content from the 
website each spider can access (“what”).  Finally, for major spiders, the designer can place a time 
limit between successive requests on the server (“how”).  Additionally, there is a proposed new 
standard under development that would allow designers to limit spider access by time of day and 
rate of request (“when”).430 
 
The second standard method of blocking web spider access is typically referred to as the Robots 
META tag.  This method differs from robots.txt in that it does not require access to the web 
server and can enable even more fine-grained control over access to individual pages of a 
website.431  It should be noted, however, that these standards are not strictly enforced and rely on 
voluntary compliance by web spiders.432  Also, neither the Robots Exclusion Protocol nor the use 
Robots META tags allows an author to express preferences as to how the data should be indexed 
or used once it is made available to the search engine via the web spider.  Some analysts argue 
that search engines should adapt to a new standard that would allow web developers to pass on 
tagging information that expresses who recorded the web content and with what devices, and 
what the author is comfortable having others do with it.433  The benefit of such a protocol would 
                                                 
426 Chau, M. and H. Chen. “Personalized and Focused Web Spiders,” in Web Intelligence, N. Zhong et al., eds. 
(New York: Springer-Verlag, February 2003), pp. 197-217, at 197. 
427 Id. at 199. 
428 Id. 
429 Id. at 198. 
430 Yang, C. and H-J. Liao, “Using the Robots.txt and Robots Meta Tags to Implement Online Copyright and a 
Related Amendment,” Library Hi Tech, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2010, pp. 94-106, at 103. 
431 Chau, supra note 426, at 198. 
432 Id. 
433 See, e.g., The proposed Automated Content Access Protocol (ACAP). Paul, R. “A Skeptical Look at the 
Automated Content Access Protocol,” ars technica, January 13, 2008. Available at: 
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GW SPHHS   
Department of Health Policy 
62
 
 be to allow those who place information on the web the opportunity to keep track of who is using 
their information and for what purposes, while allowing those accessing information to know 
when they must ask the original author for permission before re-using the information. 
 
This debate is relevant to data segmentation in health care in that it shows how web designers 
can allow access to some information while limiting access to other information.  Web spiders 
act as information requesters to all web sites on the World Wide Web—they pull information 
from each web site for indexing.  Robots.txt and Robots META tags provide examples of the 
technological capability to communicate what information should be pulled and what should not. 
 
As the internet has grown and content has become more dynamic, web spiders have evolved into 
intelligent, adaptive tools that are being used to perform complex tasks for a variety of 
purposes.434  For example, sophisticated Dark Web-focused spiders are being used in counter-
terrorism efforts to explore forums and other websites in the hidden web to seek and acquire very 
specific content.435  These intelligent spiders not only use special means of searching through 
multimedia files and attachments, but also are capable of identifying and retrieving content based 
on the sentiment and affect of the resource.436 
 
Additionally, web spiders have evolved to work within the semantic web, where web content is 
being linked through the use of metadata—machine-readable data that describes other data and 
enables a standardized way of annotating information.437  One commonly used type of metadata 
is the Resource Description Framework (RDF), which uses “triples” to indicate subject, property 
and object with respect to data.  Specially designed web spiders called “scutters” have been 
developed in order to search RDF files.  By attaching metadata to web content through the use of 
RDF, computers are able to interpret web content or web documents in a more useful way.  
Additionally, RDF enables compatibility with many vocabularies—it is not necessary for 
applications to know in advance which vocabulary will be encountered in order for inferences to 
be made.438  Some experts have identified potential benefits of using RDF tags in EHRs due to 
the interoperability of RDF tags and their ability to describe more complex relationships and 
concepts, as well as enable more intelligent, relevant searching.439 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
As the quality and quantity of health information expands through the use of EHRs and other 
technology platforms, and as electronic exchange vehicles facilitate the free flow of that 
information, our current strategies (technical, legal and otherwise) for protecting personal health 
information struggle to keep pace.  Data segmentation has been identified as a promising 
approach that can be employed to help allay concerns about health information privacy and to 
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 foster greater consumer involvement.  As we have discussed, segmentation has value in many 
other contexts as well; it can provide a mechanism for increasing consumer protections, insulate 
against the harms of hindsight or outcome bias, and enhance the utility of medical records for 
research, quality improvement, and other public health advances. 
 
We should continue to develop policies, methods and technologies that support segmentation of 
health information for at least three basic reasons: (1) our current legal environment requires the 
protection of certain types of personal health information more than others; (2) enabling granular 
patient control over the use and disclosure of their health information honors fundamental 
principles of patient autonomy and builds patient trust and participation in the health care 
system; and (3) failure to make advances in this capacity could hamper the quantity and quality 
of information available to support a more rapid learning cycle in health care. 
 
Recognition of its potential and many benefits, however, does not eliminate the complexities and 
challenges surrounding data segmentation.  As we have described, electronic exchange 
supporting some level of data segmentation has succeeded to varying degrees, although the 
solutions developed up to this point frequently are in preliminary stages and tend to enable 
segmentation only in contained environments.  Moreover, issues ranging from how data are 
structured and coded, to the level of sensitivity assigned to certain information (and who defines 
it), challenge our ability to maintain forward momentum and commitment to the endeavor.   
 
Articulated below are some observations that could help decision makers explore possible policy, 
technology and other means of enabling granular patient control of their health information 
through segmentation. 
 
Build a Bridge to Greater Autonomy 
Institutional stewards of patient information tend to rely primarily on federal and state definitions 
of what constitutes sensitive information, which in turn are mostly based in law.  Given that these 
laws often vary among states, organizations working to provide technology solutions to support 
segmentation often must develop highly-customized products and services.  This process is 
neither efficient for the data stewards involved nor for the vendors attempting to serve their client 
base.  Further, this system is entirely opaque to the individual patient.  From a consumer 
perspective, no proactive, subjective, or individual context considerations factor into the 
determination of what constitutes sensitive information. 
 
In addressing the limitations of this system, one potential approach would be to establish – 
through legal or other means – a definition of sensitive data that could attempt to weigh the 
interests and concerns of various stakeholders as well as reflect the environment in which 
information exchange now occurs.  However appealing this goal may be, though, its potential 
drawbacks warrant consideration.  Changing law in response to technology and / or societal 
developments can be a very slow process and can yield inflexible results.  This last issue is 
particularly important given the challenge of predicting how the electronic exchange 
environment is going to evolve—even in the near term.  Finally, this approach fails to prioritize 
individual choice with respect to health information management. 
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 Perhaps a more flexible and forward-looking option would be to stipulate via some method of 
policy implementation440 that people’s preferences regarding information sharing should be 
accommodated, and that the health care sector should strive to achieve this capacity within a 
specified period of time.  Recognizing that this vision likely would take years to achieve, this 
solution represents a move beyond simple default to state and federal legal requirements and 
would require data stewards to engage in direct dialogue with the patient and consumer 
communities they serve. 
 
This second option would move us closer to the goal of supporting individual, subjective 
preferences and, though we are not yet able to fully operationalize this goal, could provide an 
important stepping stone in that direction.  Given the hurdles that this transition would pose to 
many stakeholders in the health care arena, the idea also would necessitate the provision of 
significant support to help overcome the challenges associated with achieving granular and 
individualized data segmentation. 
 
Provide Direct Financial and Other Support to Stimulate Change 
While it is likely that many of the provisions in HITECH related to meaningful use will stimulate 
broader use of EHR technologies and result in the generation of more structured data, additional 
mechanisms specifically intended to encourage the development of segmentation-enabling 
processes and technologies should be considered.  Some of these methods might be more 
technical in nature, whereas others might help to mitigate provider workflow concerns or address 
gaps in flagging / tagging standards, for example.  In short, if progress on this front is a policy 
priority, then commensurate support should be provided to aid its development. 
 
For example, while a handful of technical solutions support granular choice, all currently have 
limitations.  Several of these approaches are evolving, however, and should be encouraged to 
expand, both in terms of their functionality and in the number and type of exchange they serve.  
As such, the provision of incentives for developers to test ways to better accommodate patient 
choice in a variety of exchange models and contexts should be considered.  Policy makers should 
seek ways to encourage such development and testing in applied environments, perhaps through 
the establishment of pilot projects or, though already under way, as part of future Beacon 
Community enhancements.    
 
Generate Evidence 
As referenced above, we are currently straddling two information-sharing paradigms in the 
health care sector: one that is primarily paper based, with a corresponding set of policies and 
processes, and another that is facilitated by technical advances that allow the sharing of 
information more freely between a greater number and more diverse set of stakeholders.  As we 
move through this transition, decision makers could be tempted to rely on evidence from prior 
experience in the paper environment to support the development of future policies.  Given the 
significance of this transformation, however, we suggest an alternative approach: each of the 
challenges described in this paper represents an opportunity to establish updated research 
priorities—the results of which could point to possible policy solutions or best practices.   
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One key area that would benefit significantly from additional research relates to the means by 
which patients are educated about and informed of their information management options.  
Specifically, as the landscape of information, applications, and tools available to consumers 
rapidly evolves, it would be worthwhile to explore the most effective mechanisms for facilitating 
patient decision making regarding segmentation. Further research on who, if anyone, should 
assume the role of helping patients in this regard is needed.  This analysis would include 
evaluations of whether, and if so what type, of health care providers are best suited to the task of 
assisting patients in making these decisions, and via what mechanisms.  The goal of this research 
would be to identify promising approaches to supporting consumers in their determination of 
how to establish their health information sharing preferences.  
 
These ideas represent only a few of the possible options available to policy makers in advancing 
our capacity for granular segmentation of health information.  We support the Tiger Team’s 
recent recommendation to cast a wide net in searching for appropriate means to provide patients 
more granular control over the exchange and use of their identifiable health information,441 and 
point to the efforts underway in other countries as evidence that this is a worthwhile endeavor.  
While still a challenge, data segmentation indeed holds promise for accomplishing the ultimate 
goal of accommodating the needs and desires of the multiple stakeholders engaged in the 
electronic exchange of health information. 
 
441 See Health IT Policy Committee, Privacy and Security Tiger Team, supra note 25, at 15. 
